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Abstract
This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged
in an uncertain project, and their individual eﬀorts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not
only to a reduction in eﬀort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over
time, but never ceases as long as the project has not succeeded. In fact, the delay until
the project succeeds, if it ever does, increases with the number of agents. We show why
deadlines, but not necessarily better monitoring, help to mitigate moral hazard.
1 Introduction
Cooperation evolves over time. A lack of tangible results often breeds mistrust, and mistrust
leads to lower levels of commitment. Agents grow suspicious that other team members are not
pulling their weight in the common enterprise and scale back their own involvement in response.
Is this bleak scenario the fate of every team project? What can be done to avert such a scenario?
This paper develops a formal framework to address these questions.
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1In modern times, collaborations have proven crucial in the production of knowledge at the
level of individual researchers and institutions.1 Teamwork is a special case of private provision
of public goods: when it is hard to quantify the contribution of each member on the advancement
of a project, free-riding arises. What sets teamwork apart from most existing models of provision
of public goods, though, is the uncertainty regarding the intrinsic feasibility of the project. As of
today, and despite the best eﬀorts of minds as brilliant as Newton’s, the legendary “philosopher’s
stone” that would convert base metals into gold has not been found. Applications of the private
provision of public goods under uncertainty can be found not only in the direct production of
knowledge, but also in its ﬁnancing. Consider, for instance, a public good of unknown value,
such as voluntary contributions (donations) to medical research. Other applications include
donations to charity, and investment in research and development (R&D) by ﬁrms engaged in a
joint venture.
With very few exceptions, most of the work on public goods deals with situations that are
either static or involve complete information. This work has provided invaluable insights into the
underprovision of the public good in quantity terms. In contrast, given the scope for learning,
our interest lies with the dynamics of this provision.
The key features of our model are the following: (i) Beneﬁts are public, costs are private: the
proﬁt, or value, from completing the project is common to all agents. All it takes to complete
the project is one breakthrough, but making a breakthrough requires costly eﬀort. (ii) Success is
uncertain: some projects are doomed to failure, no matter how much eﬀort is put into them. As
for the other projects, the ﬂow probability of a breakthrough increases as the combined eﬀort of
the agents increases. Achieving a breakthrough is the only way to ascertain the project’s type.
(iii) Eﬀort is hidden: the choice of eﬀort exerted by an agent is unobserved by the other agents.
1Although Dasgupta (1988) credits Klein and Lie with the ﬁrst collaborative research in academia resulting
in joint publication, for their article on group theory in 1870, collaborative papers can be traced back to 1665
and the joint paper by Hooke, Oldenburg, Cassini and Boyle. This is not to say that collaborations did not take
place throughout scientiﬁc history, as the well-known collaborations of Kepler and Brahe, Lavoisier and Laplace,
or Gauss and Weber illustrate.
2As long as there is no breakthrough, agents receive no hard evidence whatsoever; they simply
become (weakly) more pessimistic about the prospects of the project as time goes on. This
captures the idea that output is observable, but eﬀort is not. We shall contrast our ﬁndings with
the case in which eﬀort is observable. At the end of the paper, we also discuss the intermediate
case in which a project involves several observable steps.
Our main ﬁndings are the following:
- Agents procrastinate: as is to be expected, agents slack oﬀ, i.e., there is underprovision
of eﬀort overall. Agents do not only exert too little eﬀort, but they also do so too late.
In the hope that the eﬀort of others will suﬃce, they work less than they should early
on, postponing eﬀort to later dates. Nevertheless, due to growing pessimism, the eﬀort
expended dwindles over time, but the plug on the project is never pulled. Although the
overall eﬀort expended is independent of the size of the team, the more agents are involved
in the project, the later the project gets completed on average, if ever.
- Deadlines are beneﬁcial: if agents have enough resolve to ﬁx themselves a deadline, it is
optimal to do so. This is the case despite the fact that agents pace themselves so that,
if the deadline is hit, the project is abandoned at a point at which the project is still
worthwhile. If agents could re-negotiate at this time, they would. But the deadline gives
agents incentives to exert eﬀort once it looms close enough. The deadline is desirable,
because the reduction in wasteful delay more than oﬀsets the value that is forfeited if the
deadline is reached. In this sense, the delay is more costly than the underprovision of eﬀort.
- Better monitoring need not reduce delay: when eﬀort is observed, there are multiple equi-
libria. Depending on the equilibrium, delay might be greater or smaller than under non-
observability. In the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium, delay is actually greater.
This is because individual eﬀorts are strategic substitutes. The prospects of the team
improve if it is found that an agent has slacked oﬀ, because this mitigates the growing pes-
3simism in the team. Therefore, an observable reduction in current eﬀort encourages later
eﬀort by other members, and this depresses equilibrium eﬀort. Hence, better monitoring
need not alleviate moral hazard. Nevertheless, there are also non-Markovian, “grim-trigger”
equilibria for which delay is smaller.
Some insights into the relevance of these ﬁndings can be gleaned from the data collected by
Ellison (2002). For papers that get eventually published, Ellison (2002) shows that the number
of coauthors has a positive eﬀect on the time lag between the submission and acceptance of the
paper. This agrees with our ﬁnding that increasing the team size increases the expected delay.
However, a closer look at the data used by Ellison (2002) reveals that the time lag between
submission and acceptance is decreasing in the number of coauthors when these coauthors are
located in the same department, which presumably facilitates monitoring. This is evidence
suggesting that the Markovian equilibrium outcome in the observable case does not describe
actual behavior.
The value of deadline raises the issue of mechanism design. We derive the optimal dynamic
(budget-balanced) compensation scheme, as well as the optimal wage scheme for a principal who
owns the project’s returns.
We then investigate the role of synergies. As Alchian and Demsetz (1972) have already
pointed out, it is likely that an important factor in the formation of teams is the team members’
potential to work synergistically. That is, total output might not be separable in the agents’
eﬀorts. To account for this phenomenon, we examine two extensions of the baseline model. In the
ﬁrst extension, workers may have similar skills, but their eﬀorts get combined in a non-separable
way. For concreteness, we consider the case in which the arrival rate of success in case the project
is good is a constant elasticity function of their individual eﬀorts. In the second extension, we
focus on two agents and consider the case in which agents possess diﬀerent skills, so that one
worker might be able to succeed where another could not.
These two kinds of synergy lead to diﬀerent kinds of behavior. In the ﬁrst case, there are
4multiple equilibria that are all ineﬃcient. In all equilibria, all agents put in some eﬀort. These
equilibria illustrate the distinction between the amount and the allocation of eﬀort: the symmetric
equilibrium is characterized by free-riding and signiﬁcant delay, but it also is the one in which
the probability of a breakthrough is greatest. In the second case, the agent that is viewed as
most likely to succeed starts by exerting eﬀort by himself, at a level that is socially eﬃcient. As
time passes by and no breakthrough occurs, the diﬀerence in the likelihoods of success across
agents levels oﬀ. When both agents are equally likely to succeed, they both start to exert eﬀort,
but these eﬀort levels are low because of free-riding. Unless a breakthrough occurs, both agents
keep on exerting eﬀort forever, albeit at rapidly declining levels.
Finally, we consider the case in which completing a project involves several tasks. Tasks
are independent. We are particularly interested in understanding how the type of the tasks
aﬀects the structure and eﬃciency of equilibria. Following the literature on social psychology, we
distinguish between (i) additive tasks, in which payoﬀs are additively separable in the tasks, (ii)
conjunctive tasks, in which both tasks must be completed, and (iii) disjunctive tasks, in which
the project is completed as soon as there is a breakthrough in one task. Eﬃciency requires tasks
to be worked on simultaneously when they are additive, but sequentially if they are conjunctive.
However, there are equilibria in which agents specialize and work simultaneously on diﬀerent
tasks when they are conjunctive.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, our model can be viewed as a
model of experimentation. There is a growing literature in economics on experimentation in
teams. For instance, Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) study a two-
armed bandit problem in which diﬀerent agents may choose diﬀerent arms. While free-riding
plays an important role in these papers as well, eﬀort is always observable. Rosenberg, Solan
and Vieille (2007), Hopenhayn and Squintani (2008) and Murto and V¨ alim¨ aki (2008) consider
the case in which the outcome of each agent’s action is unobservable, while their actions are
observable. This is precisely the opposite of what is assumed in this paper; here, actions are not
observed, but outcomes are. Bergemann and Hege (2005) study a principal-agent relationship
5with an information structure similar to the one considered here. All these models provide
valuable insights into how much total experimentation is socially desirable, and how much can
be expected in equilibrium. As will be clear, these questions admit trivial answers in our model,
which is therefore not well-suited to address those.
Mason and V¨ alim¨ aki (2008) consider a dynamic moral hazard problem in which eﬀort by
a single agent is unobservable. Although there is no learning, the optimal wage declines over
time, to provide incentives for eﬀort. Their model shares with ours some common features. In
particular, the strategic substitutability between current and later eﬀorts plays an important
role in both models, so that, in both cases, deadlines have beneﬁcial eﬀects. See also Toxvaerd
(2007) on deadlines, and Lewis and Ottaviani (2008) on similar eﬀects in the optimal provision
of incentives in sequential search.
Second, our model ties into the literature on free-riding in groups, starting with Olson (1965)
and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and further studied in Holmstr¨ om (1982), Legros and Matthews
(1993), and Winter (2004). In a sequential setting, Strausz (1999) describes an optimal sharing
rule. More precisely, ours is a dynamic version of moral hazard in teams with uncertain output.
The static version was introduced by Williams and Radner (1988) and also studied by Ma, Moore
and Turnbull (1988). The ineﬃciency of equilibria of repeated partnership games with imperfect
monitoring has been ﬁrst demonstrated by Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986).
Third, our paper is related to the literature on dynamic contributions to public goods. Games
with observable contributions are examined in Admati and Perry (1991), Compte and Jehiel
(2004), Fershtman and Nitzan (1991), Lockwood and Thomas (2002), and Marx and Matthews
(2000). Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) compare open- and closed-loop equilibria in a set-up
with complete information and ﬁnd that observability exacerbates free-riding. In Bag and Roy
(2008), Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984), and Gradstein (1992), agents have independently drawn and
privately known values for the public good. This type of private information is brieﬂy discussed
in the conclusion. Applications to partnerships include Levin and Tadelis (2005), and Hamilton,
Nickerson and Owan (2003). Also related is the literature in management on alliances, including,
6for instance, Doz (1996), Gulati (1995) and Gulati and Singh (1998).
There is a vast literature on free-riding, also known as social loaﬁng, in social psychology.
See, for instance, Latan´ e, Williams and Harkins (1979), or Karau and Williams (1993). Levi
(2007) provides a survey of group dynamics and team theory. The stage theory, developed by
Tuckman and Jensen (1977) and the theory by McGrath (1991) are two of the better known
theories regarding the development of project teams – the patterning of change and continuity
in team structure and behavior over time.
2 A Simple Example
Consider the following two-period game. Agent i = 1,2 may exert eﬀort in two periods
t = 1,2, in order to achieve a breakthrough. Whether a breakthrough is possible or not depends
on the quality of the project. If the project is good, the probability of a breakthrough in period
t (assuming that there was no breakthrough before) is given by the sum of the eﬀort levels ui,t
that the two agents choose in that period. However, the project might be bad, in which case a
breakthrough is impossible. Agents share a common prior belief ¯ p < 1 that the project is good.
The project ends if a breakthrough occurs. A breakthrough is worth a payoﬀ of 1 to both
agents, independently of who is actually responsible for this breakthrough. Eﬀort, on the other
hand, entails a private cost given by c(ui,t) in each period. Payoﬀs from the second period are
discounted at a common factor δ ≤ 1.
Agents do not observe their partner’s eﬀort choice. All they observe is whether a breakthrough
occurs or not. Therefore, if there is no breakthrough at the end of the ﬁrst period, agents update
their belief about the quality of the project based only on their own eﬀort choice, and their
expectation about the other agent’s eﬀort choice. Thus, if an agent chooses an eﬀort level ui,t in
7each period, and expects his opponent to exert eﬀort ˆ u−i,t, his expected payoﬀ is given by
¯ p   (ui,1 + ˆ u−i,1) − c(ui,1)
      
First period payoﬀ
+ δ(1 − ¯ p   (ui,1 + ˆ u−i,1))[ρ(ui,1, ˆ u−i,1)   (ui,2 + ˆ ui,2) − c(ui,2)
      
Second period payoﬀ
], (1)
where ρ(ui,1, ˆ u−i,1) is his posterior belief that the project is good. To understand (1), note that
the probability of a breakthrough in the ﬁrst period is the product of the prior belief assigned
to the project being good (¯ p), and the sum of eﬀort levels exerted (ui,1 + ˆ u−i,1). The payoﬀ of
such a breakthrough is 1. The cost of eﬀort in the ﬁrst period, c(ui,1), is paid in any event. If a
breakthrough does not occur, agent i updates his belief to ρ(ui,1, ˆ u−i,1), and the structure of the
payoﬀ in the second period is as in the ﬁrst period.
By Bayes’ rule, the posterior belief of agent i is given by
ρ(ui,1, ˆ u−i,1) =
¯ p   (1 − ui,1 − ˆ u−i,1)
1 − ¯ p   (ui,1 + ˆ u−i,1)
≤ ¯ p. (2)
Note that this is based on agent i’s expectation of agent −i’s eﬀort choice. That is, agents’ beliefs
are private, and they only coincide on the equilibrium path. If, for instance, agent i decides to
exert more eﬀort than he is expected to by agent −i, yet no breakthrough occurs, agent i will
become more pessimistic than agent −i, unbeknownst to him. Oﬀ-path, beliefs are no longer
common knowledge.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, agent i’s eﬀort levels (ui,1,ui,2) are optimal given (ˆ u−i,1, ˆ u−i,2),
and expectations are correct: ˆ u−i,t = u−i,t. Letting Vi denote the agent’s payoﬀ, it must be that
∂Vi
∂ui,1
= ¯ p − c




∝ ρ(ui,1, ˆ u−i,1) − c
′(ui,2) = 0,
so that, in particular, c′(ui,2) < 1. It follows that (i) the two agents’ ﬁrst-period eﬀort choices are
8neither strategic complements nor substitutes, but (ii) an agent’s eﬀort choices across periods
are strategic substitutes, as are (iii) an agent’s current eﬀort choice and the other agent’s future
eﬀort choices.
It is evident from (ii) that the option to delay reduces eﬀort in the ﬁrst period. Comparing
the one- and two-period models is equivalent to comparing the ﬁrst-period eﬀort choice for
ui,2 = ˆ ui,2 = 0 on the one hand, and a higher value on the other. This is what we refer to
as procrastination: some of the work that would otherwise be carried out by some date gets
postponed when agents get further opportunities to work afterwards.2 In our example, imposing
a deadline of one period heightens incentives in the initial period.
Further, it is also clear from (iii) that observability of the ﬁrst period’s action will lead to
a decline in eﬀort provision. With observability, a small decrease in the ﬁrst-period eﬀort level
increases the other agent’s eﬀort tomorrow. Therefore, relative to the case in which eﬀort choices
are unobservable, each agent has an incentive to lower his ﬁrst-period eﬀort level in order to
induce his partner to work harder in the second period, when his choice is observable.
As we shall see, these ﬁndings carry through with longer horizons: deadlines are desirable,
while observability, or better monitoring, is not. However, this two-period model is ill-suited
to describe the dynamics of eﬀort over time when there is no last period. To address this and
related issues, it is best to consider a baseline model in which the horizon is inﬁnite. This model
is described next.
3 The Set-up
There are n agents engaged in a common project. The project has a probability p < 1 of
being a good project, and this is commonly known by the agents. It is a bad project otherwise.
Agents continuously choose at which level to exert eﬀort over the inﬁnite horizon R+. Eﬀort
is costly, and the instantaneous cost to agent i = 1,...,n of exerting eﬀort ui ∈ R+ is ci(ui),
2To procrastinate is to “delay or postpone action,” as deﬁned by the Oxford English Dictionary.
9for some function ci( ) that is diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing. In most of the paper, we
assume that ci(ui) = ci ui, for some constant ci > 0, and that the choice is restricted to the unit
interval, i.e. ui ∈ [0,1]. The eﬀort choice is, and remains, unobserved.
Eﬀort is necessary for a breakthrough to occur. More precisely, a breakthrough occurs with
instantaneous probability equal to f(u1,...,un), if the project is good, and to zero if the project
is bad. That is, if agents were to exert a constant eﬀort ui over some interval of time, then the
delay until they found out that the project is successful would be distributed exponentially over
that time interval with parameter f(u1,...,un). The function f is diﬀerentiable and strictly
increasing in each of its arguments. In the baseline model, we assume that f is additively
separable and linear in eﬀort choices, so that f(u1,...,un) =
 
i=1,...,n λiui, for some λi > 0,
i = 1,...,n.
The game ends if a breakthrough occurs. Let τ ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞} denote the random time at
which the breakthrough occurs (τ = +∞ if it never does). We interpret such a breakthrough
as the successful completion of the project. A successful project is worth a net present value of
1 to each of the agents.3 As long as no breakthrough occurs, agents reap no beneﬁts from the
project. Agents are impatient, and discount future beneﬁts and costs at a common discount rate
r.
If agents exert eﬀort (u1,...,un), and a breakthrough arrives at time t < ∞, the average











while if a breakthrough never arrives (t = ∞), his payoﬀ is simply −r
  ∞
0 e−rsci(ui,s)ds. The
agent’s objective is to choose his eﬀort so as to maximize his expected payoﬀ.
To be more precise, a (pure) strategy for agent i is a measurable function ui : R+ → [0,1], with
the interpretation that ui,t is the instantaneous eﬀort exerted by agent i at time t, conditional
3We discuss this assumption further in Section 4.2.
10on no breakthrough having occurred. Given a strategy proﬁle u := (u1,...,un), it follows from
Bayes’ rule that the belief held in common by the agents that the project is good (hereafter, the
common belief), p, is given by the solution to the familiar diﬀerential equation
˙ pt = −pt(1 − pt)f(ut),
with p0 = p.4 Given that the probability that the project is good at time t is pt, and that the
instantaneous probability of a breakthrough conditional on this event is f(ut), the instantaneous
probability assigned by the agent to a breakthrough occurring is ptf(ut). It follows that the
expected instantaneous reward to agent i at time t is given by ptf(ut) − ci(ui,t). Given that the
probability that a breakthrough has not occurred by time t is given by exp{−
  t
0 psf(us)ds}, it








Given that there is a positive probability that the game lasts forever, and that agent i’s informa-
tion set at any time t is trivial, strategies that are part of a Nash equilibrium are also sequentially
rational on the equilibrium path; hence, our objective is to identify the symmetric Nash equilibria
of this game. (We shall nevertheless brieﬂy describe oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path behavior as well.)
4To see this, note that, given pt, the belief at time t + dt is
pt+dt =
pte−f(ut)dt
1 − pt + pte−f(ut)dt,
by Bayes’ rule. Subtracting pt on both sides, dividing by dt and taking limits gives the result.
114 The Benchmark Model
We begin the analysis with the special case in which agents are symmetric, and both the




λiui, ci(ui) = ciui, ui ∈ [0,1], λi = λ, ci = c, for all i.
Equivalently, we may deﬁne the normalized cost α := c/λ, and redeﬁne ui, so that each agent

















˙ pt = −pt(1 − pt)
 
i
ui,t, p0 = p.
Observe that the parameter α is the Marshallian threshold: it is equal to the belief at which
a myopic agent would stop working, because at this point the instantaneous marginal revenue
from eﬀort, pt, equals the marginal cost, α.
4.1 The Team Problem
If agents behaved cooperatively, they would choose eﬀorts so as to maximize the sum of their











where, with some abuse of notation, ut :=
 
i ui,t ∈ [0,nλ]. The integrand being positive as long
as pt ≥ α/n, it is clear that it is optimal to set ut equal to nλ as long as pt ≥ α/n, and to zero
12otherwise. The belief pt is then given by
pt =
¯ p
¯ p + (1 − ¯ p)enλt,
as long as the right-hand side exceeds α/n. In short, the team solution speciﬁes that each agent
sets his eﬀort as follows:
ui,t = λ if t ≤ Tn := (nλ)
−1 ln
¯ p(1 − α/n)
(1 − ¯ p)α/n
, and ui,t = 0 for t > Tn.
Not surprisingly, the resulting payoﬀ is decreasing in the discount rate r and the normalized cost
α, and increasing in the prior ¯ p, the upper bound λ and the number of agents, n.
Observe that the instantaneous marginal beneﬁt from eﬀort to an agent is equal to pt, which
decreases over time, while the marginal cost is constant and equal to α. Therefore, it will not be
possible to provide incentives for selﬁsh agents to exert eﬀort beyond the Marshallian threshold.
The wedge between this threshold and the eﬃcient one, α/n, captures the well-known free-riding
eﬀect in teams, which is described eloquently by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and has since been
studied extensively. In a non-cooperative equilibrium, the amount of eﬀort is too low.5 Here
instead, our focus is on how free-riding aﬀects when eﬀort is exerted.
4.2 The Non-Cooperative Solution
As mentioned above, once the common belief drops below the Marshallian threshold, agents
do not provide any eﬀort. Therefore, if p ≤ α, there is a unique equilibrium, in which no agent
ever works, and we might as well assume throughout that p > α. Further, we assume throughout
5There is neither an “encouragement eﬀect” in our set-up, unlike in some papers on experimentation (see, for
instance, Bolton and Harris (1999)), nor any eﬀect of patience on the threshold. This is because a breakthrough
yields a unique lump sum to all agents, rather than conditionally independent sequences of lump sum payoﬀs.





−1 > 0. (4)
This assumption ensures that the upper bound on the eﬀort level does not aﬀect the analysis.
The proof of the main result of this section relies on Pontryagin’s principle, but the gist of it is
perhaps best understood by the following heuristic argument from dynamic programming.
What is the trade-oﬀ between exerting eﬀort at some instant and exerting it at the next? Fix
some date t, and assume that players have followed the equilibrium strategies up to that date.
Fix also some small dt > 0, and consider the gain or loss from shifting some small eﬀort ε from
the time interval [t,t+dt] (“today”) to the time interval [t+dt,t+2dt] (“tomorrow”). Write ui,p
for ui,t,pt, and u′
i,p′ for ui,t+dt,pt+dt, and let Vi,t, or Vi, denote the unnormalized continuation
payoﬀ of agent i at time t. The payoﬀ Vi,t must satisfy the recursion
Vi,t = (p(ui + u−i) − αui)dt + (1 − rdt)(1 − p(ui + u−i)dt)Vi,t+dt.
Because we are interested in the trade-oﬀ between eﬀort today and tomorrow, we apply the same
expansion to Vi,t+dt, to obtain
Vi,t = (p(ui + u−i) − αui)dt+

















where p′ = p−p(1−p)(ui +u−i)dt.6 Consider then decreasing ui by ε and increasing u′
i by that
amount. Note that, conditional on reaching t + 2dt without a breakthrough, the resulting belief
is unchanged, and therefore, so is the continuation payoﬀ. That is, Vi,t+2dt is independent of ε.
6More precisely, for later purposes, e−p(ui+u−i)dt = 1 − p(ui + u−i)dt +
p
2
2 (ui + u−i)2(dt)2 + o(dt3).
14Therefore, to the second order,
dVi,t/dε
dt













To interpret this, note that increased eﬀort aﬀects the payoﬀ in three ways: it increases the
probability of a breakthrough, yielding a payoﬀ of 1, at a rate pt; it causes the loss of the
continuation value Vi,t at the same rate; lastly, increasing eﬀort increases cost, at a rate α.
The upshot of this result is that the trade-oﬀ between eﬀort today and tomorrow can only
be understood by considering an expansion to the third-order. Here we must recall that the
probability of a breakthrough given eﬀort level u is, to the third order, pudt − (pu)2(dt)2/2 (see
footnote 6); similarly, the continuation payoﬀ is discounted by a factor e−rdt ≈ 1−rdt+r2(dt)2/2.
Let us ﬁrst expand terms in (5), which gives





i)dt − ((1 − p)u + pu
′/2)pu
′dt
2 + [1 − (r + pu
′)dt + ((r + pu
′)





where, for this equation and the next, u := ui + u−i, u′ := u′
i + u′
−i. We then obtain, ignoring







dε       
p
2u + p(pu
′(1 − Vi) − αu
′
i − rVi) − (r + pu)pVi + p(1 − p)u
′(1 − Vi)
+ p(r + pu
′)Vi − p(1 − p)u(1 − Vi) − p
2u
′ − (r + pu)(p(1 − Vi) − α)








Assuming that ui and u−i are continuous, almost all terms vanish. We are left with
dVi,t/dε
dt2 = αp(ui + u−i) − r(p − α) − αpui.
15This means that postponing eﬀort to tomorrow is unproﬁtable if and only if
αpui ≥ αp(ui + u−i) − r(p − α). (6)
Equation (6) admits a simple interpretation. What is the beneﬁt of working a bit more today,
relative to tomorrow? At a rate p (the current belief), working today increases the probability
of an immediate breakthrough, in which event the agent will not have to pay the cost of the
planned eﬀort tomorrow (αui). This is the left-hand side. What is the cost? If the agent waited
until tomorrow before working a bit harder, there is a chance that this extra eﬀort will not have
to be carried out. The probability of this event is p   (ui + u−i), and the cost saved is α per unit
of extra eﬀort. This gives the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side. Of course, there is also a cost of
postponing, given that agents are impatient. This cost is proportional to the mark-up of eﬀort,
p − α, and gets subtracted on the right-hand side.
First, observe that, as p → α, the right-hand side of (6) exceeds the left-hand side if u−i is
bounded away from zero. Eﬀort tends to zero as p tends to α. Similarly, eﬀort must tend to zero
as r → 0.
Second, assume for the sake of contradiction that agents stop working at some ﬁnite time.
Then, considering the penultimate instant, it must be that, up to the second order, p − α =
p(1 − p)(ui + u−i)dt, and so we may divide both sides of (6) by ui + u−i = nui, yielding




which is impossible, as dt is arbitrarily small. Therefore, not only does eﬀort go to zero as p
tends to α, but it does so suﬃciently fast that the belief never reaches the threshold α, and
agents keep on working on the project forever, albeit at negligible rates.
It is now easy to guess what the equilibrium value of ui must be. Given that agent i must be
16indiﬀerent between exerting eﬀort or not, and also exerting it at diﬀerent instants, we must have




Hence, the common belief tends to the Marshallian threshold asymptotically, and total eﬀort,
as a function of the belief, is actually decreasing in the number of agents. To understand this
last result, observe that the equilibrium reﬂects the logic of mixed strategies. Because eﬀorts are
perfect substitutes, the indiﬀerence condition of each agent requires that the total eﬀort by all
agents but him be a constant that depends on the belief, but not on the number of agents. Thus,
each agent’s level of eﬀort must be decreasing in the number of agents. In turn, this implies
that the total eﬀort by all agents for a given belief is the sum of a constant function and of a
decreasing function of the number of agents. Therefore, it is decreasing in the number of agents.
This simple logic relies on two substitutability assumptions: eﬀorts of diﬀerent agents are
perfect substitutes, and the cost function is linear. Both assumptions will be relaxed later.
We emphasize that, because eﬀort is not observed, players only share a common belief on the
equilibrium path. For an arbitrary history, an agent’s best-reply depends both on the public and
on his private belief. Using dynamic programming is diﬃcult, because the optimality equation is
then a partial diﬀerential equation. Pontryagin’s principle, on the other hand, is ideally suited,
because the other agents’ strategies can be viewed as ﬁxed, given the absence of feedback.
The next theorem, proved in the appendix, describes the strategy on the equilibrium path.7
Theorem 1 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which, on the equilibrium path, the











n−1r(α−1−1)t, for all t ≥ 0. (7)
7In the case p = 1 that was ruled out earlier, the game reduces essentially to the static game. The eﬀort level




17If an agent deviated, what would his continuation strategy be? Suppose that this deviation
is such that, at time t, the aggregate eﬀort of agent i alone over the interval [0,t] is lower than it
would have been on the equilibrium path. This means that agent i is more optimistic than the
other agents, and his private belief exceeds their common belief. Given that agent i would be
indiﬀerent between exerting eﬀort or not if he shared the common belief, his optimism leads him
to exert maximal eﬀort until the time at which his private belief catches up with the other agents’
common belief, at which point he will revert to the common, symmetric strategy. If instead his
realized aggregate eﬀort up to t is greater than in equilibrium, then he is more pessimistic than
the other agents, and he will provide no eﬀort until the common belief catches up with his
private belief, if ever. This completes the description of the equilibrium strategy. In section 6,
we characterize asymmetric equilibria of the baseline model, and allow for asymmetries in the
players’ characteristics.
From (7), it is immediate to derive the following comparative statics. To avoid confusion, we
refer to total eﬀort at time t as the sum of instantaneous, individual eﬀort levels at that time,
and to aggregate eﬀort at t as the sum (i.e. the integral) of total eﬀort over all times up to t.
Lemma 1 In the symmetric equilibrium:
1. Eﬀort decreases over time, and increases in r and p.
2. Aggregate eﬀort decreases in α. It also decreases in, but is asymptotically independent of,
n: the probability of an eventual breakthrough is independent of the number of agents, but
the distribution of the time of the breakthrough with more agents ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates this distribution with fewer agents.
3. The agent’s payoﬀ Vi(p) is increasing in n and p, decreasing in α, and independent of r.
Total eﬀort is decreasing in n for a given belief p, so that total eﬀort is also decreasing in n
for small enough t. However, this implies that the belief decreases more slowly with more agents.
Because eﬀort is increasing in the belief, it must then be that total eﬀort is eventually higher in
larger teams. Because the asymptotic belief is α, independently of n, aggregate eﬀort must be
18independent of n as well. Ultimately, then, larger teams must catch up in terms of eﬀort, but
this also means that larger teams are slower to succeed.8























































































Figure 1: Individual and total eﬀort
In particular, for teams of diﬀerent size, the distributions of the random time τ of a break-
through, conditional on a breakthrough occurring eventually, are ranked by ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance. We deﬁne the expected cost of delay as 1−E[e−rτ|τ < ∞]. It follows from Lemma 1
that the cost of delay is increasing in n. However, it is independent of r, because more impatient
agents work harder, but discount the future more. As mentioned above, the agents’ payoﬀs are
also increasing in n. This is obvious for one vs. two agents, because an agent may always act as
if he were by himself, securing the payoﬀ from a single-agent team. It is less obvious that larger,
slower teams achieve higher payoﬀs. Our result shows that, for larger teams, the reduction in
individual eﬀort more than oﬀsets the increased cost of delay. Figure 1 and the left panel of
Figure 2 illustrate these results.
Note that the comparative statics with respect to the number of agents hinge upon our
assumption that the project’s returns per agent were independent of n. If instead the total value
of the project is ﬁxed independently of n, so that each agent’s share decreases linearly in n,
8As a referee observed, this is reminiscent of the bystander eﬀect, as in the Kitty Genovese case: because more
agents are involved, each agent optimally scales down his involvement, resulting in an outcome that worsens with
the number of agents.






























































































Figure 2: Payoﬀs and cost of delay. Left: value per agent = 1; right: value per agent = 1/n.
aggregate eﬀort decreases with the team’s size, and tedious calculations show that each agent’s
payoﬀ decreases as well. See the right panel of Figure 2 for an illustration.
While the symmetric equilibrium is unique, there exist other, asymmetric, equilibria. Con-
sider, for instance, the case of two agents only (n = 2). If an agent were by himself, he would
behave as he would in the cooperative set-up. That is, he would exert maximal eﬀort up to time
T1, at which his belief reaches the level α. Faced with such behavior, the best reply of another
(suﬃciently patient) agent would be to exert no eﬀort whatsoever; indeed, the value of eﬀort
identiﬁed in the symmetric equilibrium is precisely the threshold such that, if an agent expected
his partner to put in more eﬀort than this, he would ﬁnd it optimal to put in none himself. So
there is an asymmetric equilibrium in which one agent behaves as if he were by himself, and in
which the other agent puts no eﬀort whatsoever. It is not diﬃcult, then, to see that there is
actually an entire continuum of equilibria, of which we have identiﬁed the two extreme points.
Each equilibrium is indexed by an agent i = 1,2, and some time t1 ≤ T1, such that, up to time t1,
agent i chooses maximum eﬀort, while agent −i exerts no eﬀort at all, and from time t1 onward,
given the resulting belief at time t1, the two agents behave as in the symmetric equilibrium.
In the appendix, we prove that, as long as, as assumed, λ/r ≥ α−1 − p−1, every equilibrium
is indexed by a collection of nested subsets of agents, {i} ⊂ {i,j} ⊂ {i,j,k} ⊂     ⊂ {1,...,n},
20and (not necessarily distinct) times t1 ≤ t2 ≤     ≤ tn, with t1 ∈ [0,T1], tk ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} for
k ≥ 2 (with t1 = T1 ⇒ t2 =     = tn = T1, while t1 < T1 ⇒ tn = ∞), such that agent i exerts
maximal eﬀort by himself up to t1, agents i,j exert eﬀort as in the symmetric equilibrium (i.e.,
ui = uj = r(α−1 − p−1) given the resulting p) over the interval (t1,t2], etc.9 The symmetric
equilibrium obtains for t1 =     = tn−1 = 0.
Clearly, if agents are suﬃciently patient (so that ui,t < λ for all t), the overall payoﬀ of the
team is maximized by the asymmetric equilibrium in which one agent works by himself. So,
according to the utilitarian rule, this asymmetric equilibrium is the best equilibrium and the
symmetric equilibrium is the worst. However, according to the maximin rule, the ranking is
reversed, because the agent who works alone is worse oﬀ than in the symmetric equilibrium.
The existence of such an asymmetric equilibrium relies on the strong substitutability condi-
tions that have been assumed so far. As we shall see, if the agents’ eﬀorts display complemen-
tarities, such an extreme outcome can no longer occur in equilibrium. Nevertheless, the trade-oﬀ
between eﬃciency and fairness will persist.
The assumption regarding the discount rate was necessary to ensure that the agent’s in-
dividual eﬀort characterized in Theorem 1 was less than the maximum eﬀort level λ. If this
assumption is not satisﬁed, it is possible that both agents exert maximal eﬀort simultaneously,
at least initially. That is, the unique symmetric equilibrium then has the feature that all agents
exert maximal eﬀort up to time t at which, given the resulting belief, the level of eﬀort ui(p), as
deﬁned above the theorem, is equal to λ (since ui(p) → 0 as p → α, this always occurs at some
time t < Tn). From that point on, agents exert eﬀort at level ui(p), and the qualitative features
of the equilibrium are as before.
So far, agents have been assumed to be identical. If the normalized cost α is the same across
agents, but not necessarily the capacity λi, there is little change in the analysis. In particular,
the symmetric equilibrium remains an equilibrium provided that λi/r ≥ α−1 −p−1 for all agents
i. Similarly, if agents have diﬀerent discount rates, there is an equilibrium in which all agents
9Conversely, for any such collection of subsets of agents and switching times, there exists an equilibrium.
21exert interior eﬀort levels, so that the more patient agent i is, the smaller u−i is.
However, the outcome changes dramatically if the normalized cost diﬀers across agents. In-
deed, if αi < minj =i αj (and λi/r ≥ α−1 − p−1 for all i), then, in the unique equilibrium of the
game, agent i behaves as if he were on his own, by exerting maximal eﬀort up to the point at
which the belief p reaches αi. The proof for the case n = 2 is in the appendix. The intuition is
straightforward. Given that agent i has incentives to exert eﬀort for any belief p > αi, but no
other agent has an incentive to exert any eﬀort as soon as p < minj =i αj, agent i must be the last
agent to exert eﬀort.10 At that point, he might as well exert maximum eﬀort. However, consider
the last agent other than i, say j, to exert any eﬀort, and let t be the time at which he is supposed
to stop exerting eﬀort. At time t − dt, agent j has a strict preference for procrastinating. After
all, that last bit of eﬀort could always be exerted later, and given that agent i will be starting
to exert maximum eﬀort in an instant, the probability that he might be able to avoid exerting
this eﬀort altogether is high enough for him to defer. This implies that t = 0; hence, agent i is
always the only one to exert eﬀort.
The same reasoning applies if agents have diﬀerent prior beliefs ¯ pi, or if one agent has a
higher value for success. Then the most optimistic, or the most productive agent (say, agent i)
must exert eﬀort all by himself. In particular, if entering the collaboration involved any type of
additional cost for each agent, agent i would never join the team.
Again, this extreme outcome is partly driven by the perfect substitutability in the productivity
of the agents’ eﬀorts. As we shall see, when eﬀorts are imperfect substitutes, both agents work
even when their productivities diﬀer. Nevertheless, it is suggestive that teams involving agents
with skills of a similar kind, but dissimilar levels, are unlikely to be successful.
10More precisely, it cannot be that limt→∞ pt > αi, because, when the combined eﬀorts of all agents j  = i
become negligible, agent i has a strict incentive to exert maximum eﬀort. Hence, limt pt = αi, so that, if t is the
smallest solution to pt = minj =i αj, agent i must be the only agent exerting eﬀort after t.
224.3 A Comparison with the Observable Case
We now contrast the previous ﬁndings with the corresponding results for the case in which
eﬀort is perfectly observable. That is, we assume here that all agents’ eﬀorts are observable,
and that agent i’s choice as to how much eﬀort to exert at time t (hereafter, his eﬀort choice)
may depend on the entire history of eﬀort choices up to time t. Note that the “cooperative,” or
socially optimal solution is the same whether eﬀort choices are observed or not: delay is costly,
so that all work should be carried out as fast as possible; the threshold belief beyond which such
work is unproﬁtable must be, as before, p = α/n, which is the point at which marginal beneﬁts
of eﬀort to the team are equal to its marginal cost.
Such a continuous-time game involves well-known nontrivial modeling choices. A standard
way to sidestep these choices is to focus on Markov strategies. Here, the obvious state variable is
the belief p. Unlike in the unobservable case, this belief is always commonly held among agents,
even after histories oﬀ the equilibrium path.
A strategy for agent i, then, is a map ui : [0,1] → [0,λ] from possible beliefs p into an
eﬀort choice ui(p), such that (i) ui is left-continuous; and (ii) there is a ﬁnite partition of [0,1]
into intervals of strictly positive length on each of which ui is Lipschitz-continuous. By standard
results, a proﬁle of Markov strategies u( ) uniquely deﬁnes a law of motion for the agents’ common
belief p, from which the (expected) payoﬀ given any initial belief p can be computed (cf. Presman
(1990) or Presman and Sonin (1990)). A Markov equilibrium is a proﬁle of Markov strategies
such that, for each agent i, and each belief p, the function ui maximizes i’s payoﬀ given initial
belief p. See, for instance, Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005) for details. Following standard steps,
agent i’s continuation payoﬀ given p, Vi(p), must satisfy the optimality equation given by, for all
p, and dt > 0, to the second order,
Vi (p) = max
ui
{((ui + u−i)pt − uiα)dt + (1 − (r + (ui + u−i)pt)dt)Vi (pt+dt)}
= max
ui
{((ui + u−i)pt − uiα)dt + (1 − (r + (ui + u−i)pt)dt)(Vi (p) − (ui + u−i)p(1 − p)V
′
i (p)dt)}.
23Taking limits as dt → 0 yields
0 = max
ui
{(ui + u−i)p − uiα − (r + (ui + u−i)p)Vi (p) − (ui + u−i)p(1 − p)V
′
i (p)},
assuming, as will be veriﬁed, that V is diﬀerentiable. We focus here on a symmetric equilibrium
in which the eﬀort choice is interior. Given that the maximand is linear in ui, its coeﬃcient must
be zero. That is, dropping the agent’s subscript,
p − α − pV (p) − p(1 − p)V
′ (p) = 0,
and since V (α) = 0, the value function is given by

















It is standard to verify that the resulting u is the unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle provided
that p is such that u ≤ λ for all p < p. In particular, this is satisﬁed when, as assumed in
the unobservable case, λ/r ≥ α−1 − p−1, which we maintain henceforth. In the model without
observability, recall that, in terms of the belief p, the eﬀort is given by u(p) = r
n−1(α−1 − p−1).
As is clear from these formulas, the eventual belief is the same whether eﬀort is observed or not,
and so aggregate eﬀort over time is the same in both models. However, delay is not.
Theorem 2 In the symmetric Markov equilibrium with observable eﬀort, the equilibrium level
of eﬀort is strictly lower, for all beliefs, than that in the unobservable case.
Thus, ﬁxing a belief, the instantaneous equilibrium level of eﬀort is lower when previous
24choices are observable, and so is the welfare. This means that delay is greater under observability.
While this may be a little surprising, it is an immediate consequence of the fact that eﬀort
choices are strategic substitutes. Because eﬀort is increasing in the common belief, and because
a reduction in one agent’s eﬀort choice leads to a lower rate of decrease in the common belief,
such a reduction leads to a greater level of eﬀort by other agents. That is, to some extent, the
other agents take up the slack. This depresses the incentives to exert eﬀort and leads to lower
equilibrium levels. This cannot happen when eﬀort is unobservable, because an agent cannot
induce the other agents into exerting the eﬀort for him. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship. As
can be seen from the right panel, a lower level of eﬀort for every value of the belief p does not
imply a lower level of eﬀort for every time t: given that the total eﬀort over the inﬁnite horizon
is the same in both models, levels of eﬀort are eventually higher in the observable case.
The individual payoﬀ is independent of the number of agents n ≥ 2 in the team in the
observable case. This is a familiar rent-dissipation result: when the size of the team increases,
agents waste in additional delay what they save in individual cost. This can be seen directly
from the formula for the level of eﬀort, in that the total eﬀort of all agents but i is independent
of n. It is worth pointing out that this is not true in the unobservable case. This is one example
in which the formula that gives the eﬀort as a function of the common belief is misleading in
the unobservable case: given p, the total instantaneous eﬀort of all agents but i is independent
of n here as well. Yet the value of p is not a function of the player’s information only: it is the
common belief about the unobserved past total eﬀorts, including i’s eﬀort; hence, it depends on
the number of agents. As we have seen, welfare is actually increasing in the number of agents in
the unobservable case. The comparison is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3.
In the observable case, there also exist asymmetric Markov equilibria, similar to those de-
scribed in Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), in which agents “take turns” at exerting eﬀort. In
these Markovian equilibria, the “switching points” are deﬁned in terms of the common belief.
Because eﬀort is observable, if agent i procrastinates, this “freezes” the common belief and
therefore postpones the time of switching until agent i makes up for the wasted time. So, the





















































































Figure 3: Welfare and eﬀort in the observable vs. non-observable case
punishment for procrastination is automatic. Taking turns is impossible without observability.
Suppose that agent i is expected to exert eﬀort alone up to time t, while another agent j ex-
erts eﬀort alone during some time interval starting at time t. Any agent working alone must
be exerting maximal eﬀort, if at all, because of discounting. Because any deviation by agent i
is not observable, agent j will start exerting eﬀort at time t no matter what. It follows that,
at a time earlier than but close enough to t, agent i can procrastinate, wait for the time t′ at
which agent j will stop, and only then, if necessary, make up for this foregone eﬀort (t′ is ﬁnite
because j exerts maximal eﬀort). This alternative strategy is a proﬁtable deviation for i if he
is patient enough, because the induced probability that the postponed eﬀort will not be exerted
more than oﬀsets the loss in value due to discounting. Therefore, such switching is impossible
without observability, independently of the agents’ discount rate.
In the observable case, there exist other, non-Markovian symmetric equilibria. As mentioned
above, appropriate concepts of equilibrium have been deﬁned carefully elsewhere (see, for in-
stance, Bergin and McLeod (1993)). It is not diﬃcult to see how one can deﬁne formally a
“grim-trigger” equilibrium, for low enough discount rates, in which all agents exert eﬀort at a
maximal rate until time T1 at which p = α, and if there is a unilateral deviation by agent i, all
26other agents stop exerting eﬀort, leaving agent i with no choice but to exert eﬀort at a maximal
rate from this point on until the common belief reaches α. While this equilibrium is not ﬁrst-
best, it clearly does better than the Markovian equilibrium in the observable case, and than the
symmetric equilibrium in the unobservable case.11
Which equilibrium is more likely to emerge? As a simple application, we reconsider the data
that was used by Ellison (2002). This data, as mentioned above, corroborates one of our main
ﬁndings: as the number of coauthors increases, the time lag between submission and acceptance
of the paper increases. As a rudimentary measure of observability, we consider, for each paper,
the number of coauthors aﬃliated with the same department. The underlying assumption is that
it is easier to monitor eﬀort when coauthors are physically close; hence, we view papers written
by several authors from the same department as being projects with observable levels of eﬀort,
and papers written by distant coauthors as projects with unobservable levels of eﬀort. As Table
1 illustrates, the diﬀerence between these two kinds of papers is striking: an additional coauthor
increases the time lag by a month on average; however, it actually increases it by one month
and a half if the coauthors are geographically distant, while it reduces the time lag by two weeks
when they are neighbors. Both results are statistically signiﬁcant. On one hand, this reinforces
the main conclusion of the unobservable case. On the other hand, this is suggestive evidence that
coauthors in the same department do not follow the prescription of the Markovian equilibrium.
The grim-trigger equilibrium, for instance, is consistent with the data. Delay is decreasing in the
number of coauthors, because coauthors exert eﬀort at a maximal rate. Therefore, increasing
the number of authors increases the total amount of eﬀort exerted at any instant.
It would be interesting to examine whether the quality of monitoring aﬀects the amount of
eﬀort that is exerted, in addition to the delay. The acceptance rate could be used as a proxy
variable. Unfortunately, the data is not suited for such an analysis, because it is restricted to
papers that were accepted eventually.
11It is tempting to consider grim-trigger strategy proﬁles in which agents exert eﬀort for beliefs below α. We
ignore them here, because such strategy proﬁles cannot be limits of equilibria of discretized versions of the game.
27Table 1: Submit-Accept Time Regressions
(1) (2)
Submit-accept time Submit-accept time
Total number of 28.970** 46.430***
authors [14.232] [15.511]
Number of coauthors -61.156**
in the same department [26.032]
Journal dummies Yes Yes
Journal trends Yes Yes
Field dummies Yes Yes
Observations 1393 1393
Note: The dependent variable is the length of time between submission of a paper to
a journal and its acceptance in days. The sample is a subset of the set of papers pub-
lished in the top ﬁve or six general-interest economics journals between 1990 and 1998.
The total number of authors ranges from 1 to 3. All regressions include journal dum-
mies, journal-speciﬁc linear time trends, dummies for 17 ﬁelds of economics, and all
the control variables used by Ellison (2002) in Table 6. Robust standard errors are
reported in brackets (∗p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗p < 0.01).
285 Deadlines and Other Mechanisms
In the absence of any kind of commitment, the equilibrium outcome described above seems
inevitable. Pleas and appeals to cooperate are given no heed and deadlines are disregarded. In
this section, we examine what can be done to improve upon this outcome. Three mechanisms
are considered.
The ﬁrst mechanism is a self-imposed time-limit. We assume that agents can commit to a
deadline and that they choose the optimal deadline such that, if no breakthrough has occurred
by this time, all agents stop exerting eﬀort and the project is abandoned. Eﬀectively, this is
equivalent to considering the game with a ﬁnite horizon. We examine which is the optimal
horizon.
A deadline is an extreme version of a symmetric reward scheme, in which the entire surplus is
shared evenly if a breakthrough obtains before the deadline expires, but is completely destroyed
afterwards. In the second mechanism, agents can commit to any symmetric reward scheme (as
a function of time) they wish to, but the scheme has to be ex ante budget-balanced. Clearly,
this must at least weakly improve on a deadline, and we show that, in fact, a deadline is not the
optimal mechanism satisfying ex ante budget balance; it is the optimal mechanism satisfying ex
post budget balance.
Finally, we contrast this “team” reward scheme with the one that a principal who reaps the
beneﬁts of the project would wish to implement. Here as well, because the identity of the actual
agent responsible for the breakthrough is not observed, attention is restricted to symmetric
schemes in which the principal promises the same reward to all agents, but this reward is allowed
to depend on time.
In this section, we normalize the capacity λ to 1.
295.1 Deadlines
For some possibly inﬁnite deadline T ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}, and some strategy proﬁle (u1,...,un) :








That is, if time T arrives and no breakthrough has occurred, the continuation payoﬀ of the agents
is nil. The baseline model of Section 4 is the special case in which T = ∞. The next lemma,
which we prove in the appendix, describes the symmetric equilibrium for T < ∞. Throughout
this subsection, we maintain the restriction on the discount rate r, given by (4), that we imposed
in Section 4.2.
Lemma 2 Given T < ∞, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, characterized by ˜ T ∈
[0,T), in which the level of eﬀort is given by
ui,t = u
∗
i,t for t < ˜ T, and ui,t = 1 for t ∈ [˜ T,T],
where u∗
i is as in Theorem 1. The time ˜ T is non-decreasing in the parameter T and strictly
increasing for T large enough. Moreover, the belief at time T strictly exceeds α.
See Figure 4. According to Lemma 2, eﬀort is ﬁrst decreasing over time, and over this time
interval, it is equal to its value when the deadline is inﬁnite. At that point, the deadline is far
enough in the future not to aﬀect the agents’ incentives. However, at some point, the deadline
looms large above the agents. Agents recognize that the deadline is near and exert maximal
eﬀort from then on. But it is then too late to catch up with the aggregate eﬀort exerted in
the inﬁnite-horizon case, and pT > α. By waiting until time ˜ T, agents take a chance. It is
not diﬃcult to see that the eventual belief pT must strictly exceed α: if the deadline were not
binding, each agent would prefer to procrastinate at instant ˜ T, given that all agents then exert




































Figure 4: Optimal strategies given a deadline of T = 3
maximal eﬀort until the end.
Figure 4 also shows the eﬀort level in the symmetric Markov equilibrium with observable eﬀort
in the presence of a deadline (a Markov strategy is now a function of the remaining time and
the public belief). The analysis of this case can be found in the appendix. With a long enough
deadline, equilibrium eﬀort in the observable case can be divided into three phases. Initially,
eﬀort is low and declining. Then, at some point, eﬀort stops altogether. Finally, eﬀort jumps
back up to the maximal level. The last phase can be understood as in the unobservable case; the
penultimate one is a stark manifestation of the incentives to procrastinate under observability.
Note, however, that the time at which eﬀort jumps back up to the maximal level is a function
of the remaining time and the belief, and the latter depends on the history of eﬀort so far. As
a result, this occurs earlier under observability than non-observability. Therefore, eﬀort levels
between the two scenarios cannot be compared pointwise, although the belief as the deadline
expires is higher in the observable case (i.e., aggregate eﬀort exerted is lower).
The next theorem establishes that it is in the agents’ best interest to ﬁx such a deadline. That
is, agents gain from restricting the set of strategies that they can choose from. Furthermore, the
deadline is set precisely in order that agents will have strong incentives throughout.






α(n − p) − r(p − α)
.
It is the longest time for which it is optimal for all agents to exert eﬀort at a maximal rate
throughout.
Note that the deadline is decreasing in n, because it is the product of two positive and
decreasing functions of n. That is, tighter deadlines need to be set when teams are larger. This
is a consequence of the stronger incentives to shirk in larger teams. Furthermore nT decreases
in n as well. That is, the total amount of experimentation is lower in larger teams. However, it
is easy to verify that the agent’s payoﬀ is increasing in the team size. Larger teams are bad in
terms of overall eﬃciency, but good in terms of individual payoﬀs.
In the appendix, it is also shown that T is increasing in r: the more impatient the agents, the
longer the optimal deadline. This should not come as a surprise, because it is easier to induce
agents who have a greater level of impatience to work longer.
One might suspect that the extreme features of the equilibrium eﬀort pattern in presence of
a deadline is driven by the linearity in the cost function. Indeed, as was reported in the last
section, the path of equilibrium eﬀort appears to be continuous over time when the cost function
is quadratic. Nevertheless, a deadline provides additional incentives to exert eﬀort when time is
running short, and the graph of the level of eﬀort is U-shaped in a variety of circumstances.12
5.2 The Optimal Budget-Balanced Mechanism
The setting of a deadline is a rather extreme way in which the team can aﬀect incentives. We
now consider a more general class of mechanisms. Agents can commit to a common wage that is
12Readers have pointed out to us that this eﬀort pattern in the presence of a deadline reminds them of their
own behavior as a single author. Sadly, it appears that such behavior is hopelessly suboptimal for n = 1. We
refer to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) for a behavioral model with which they might identify.
32an arbitrary function of time. In the case of a breakthrough, each agent collects this wage. The
budget is required to be balanced on average, given that the project is worth v = n to the team
(because success is a public good that yields a beneﬁt of 1 to each of the n agents, its value v
equals n).
























where u−i := (n−1)u, because agents choose the level of eﬀort that they will exert noncoopera-
tively. We ﬁnd that ﬁxing a constant wage is not optimal, and neither is ﬁxing a deadline, in the
sense described above (i.e. ﬁxing a constant wage up to some time-limit, after which the wage is
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Theorem 4 The optimal wage scheme w is given by
wt = w
∗
t for t ≤ ˆ T, and wt = 0 for t > ˆ T,
for some ˆ T, such that ut = 1 until time ˆ T, and ut = 0 thereafter.13
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This theorem is proved in the appendix, where it is further shown that, at least for small enough
discount rates, the belief at the ﬁnal time ˆ T is above the asymptotic belief in the baseline
model. Thus, if agents are patient enough, the optimal mechanism helps to alleviate the free-
rider problem, but does not bring the total eﬀort back to its eﬃcient level. As is the case with
a deadline, it is optimal to have agents exert maximal eﬀort until eﬀort stops completely. For
low discount rates, the wage is decreasing over time: frontloading payments allows to incentivize
agents, because the shrinking wage counteracts the incentive to procrastinate. Frontloading
cannot be achieved with a deadline; hence, maximal eﬀort is sustained here over a longer horizon,
as ˆ T > T.
This analysis supports the relevance of staggered prizes in the design of scientiﬁc competitions.
Such degressive rewards are implemented, among others, by the X Prize foundation (in, for
example, the design of the Google Lunar X Prize).
13Clearly, the choice of wt for t > T ∗ is to a large extent arbitrary.
345.3 The Principal Agent Problem
Up to this point, attention has been on what the team could do to help itself. Now, we
consider the problem from the perspective of a principal who designs the payment that the agent
or agents receive (the analysis that follows holds for all n ≥ 1). As mentioned, we restrict
attention to symmetric schemes. Given that it is clear that the principal cannot beneﬁt from
paying wages to unsuccessful agents, such a scheme can be summarized by a wage schedule wt,
with the interpretation that each agent receives wt if the project gets completed at time t (as will
be clear, agents do not gain by delaying the announcement of a breakthrough). The principal
can commit to any wage path he would like to.

















Indeed, observe that a breakthrough arrives at rate ui + u−i = nu, and that the total wage bill
is nwt. Given that an agent can only be provided with a suﬃcient incentive to exert eﬀort if
the marginal beneﬁt, pw, covers the marginal cost, α, and given that the principal’s mark-up
in case of a breakthrough is v − nw, there is no scope for a proﬁtable scheme if v ≤ nα/p.
Conversely, whenever v > nα/p, the principal may always design some wage scheme that is
proﬁtable, because ﬁxing a constant wage that is equal to the average of v/n and α/p is feasible.
Theorem 5 The optimal wage scheme w is given by
wt = w
∗
t for t ≤ T
∗, and wt = 0 for t > T
∗,
35which is such that ut = 1 until time T ∗ := 1
n lnδ < ˆ T, and ut = 0 thereafter.14
Observe that the principal’s wage scheme follows the same dynamics as the wage scheme that
is optimal for the team. For both problems, it is optimal to induce maximal eﬀort as cheaply
as possible, as long as any eﬀort is worthwhile, but eﬀort stops being worthwhile earlier for the
monopolist.
In the principal’s problem, the wage dynamics must oﬀset the free-riding incentives. The
principal must concede some rents to the agents to induce them to work early. This is easier
when agents are impatient (the wage decreases in r), and more diﬃcult when they are more
agents. In fact, the principal’s payoﬀ is decreasing in the number of agents: a larger team means
more eﬀort early, but the cost in terms of additional rents more than oﬀsets this beneﬁt. In
fact, the maximal amount of total eﬀort produced (nT ∗ = lnδ) is decreasing in the number
of agents: the larger the team, the less the principal is willing to experiment. Again, this can
be easily understood in terms of the familiar trade-oﬀ faced by a monopolist, who must trade
oﬀ lower output against lower rents. Observe that this amount of eﬀort is independent of the
discount rate. While discounting aﬀects the rents, it also aﬀects the cost of providing this rent,
and because the principal and the agents have the same discount rate, these eﬀects cancel out.
As the discount rate r tends to zero, the wage approaches the aﬃne function w(δ)−αt(n − 1),




p δ + n−1
n lnδ
 
. To provide incentives when agents are perfectly patient,
the wage must decay at the rate of the marginal cost (or be constant when n = 1).
Figure 5 illustrates how the wage scheme varies with the parameters. Eﬀort stops when
ptwt = α, or wt = pt/α. Note that this time is independent of the discount rate, as is already
clear from the formula for δ. This means that the total amount of eﬀort is independent of the
discount rate, and so is eﬃciency. On the other hand, the amount of eﬀort varies with the size of
the group. As is easy to verify, the value of δ is decreasing in n: the larger the group, the higher
the aggregate eﬀort. However, the principal’s payoﬀ need not increase in n. Smaller groups are
14Here as well, the choice of wt for t > T ∗ is to a large extent arbitrary.
36typically better, because it is less costly to overcome the incentive to free-ride.































Figure 5: Optimal wages
One might wonder whether total eﬀort is lower under an output-restricting, but sophisticated
principal, or under a mechanism as imperfect as a self-imposed deadline. It is shown in the
appendix that, when v = n, so that the comparison is meaningful, and the discount rate is
suﬃciently low, T P ≤ T: a principal stops the project before the optimal deadline. Clearly,
agents are then worse oﬀ.
6 Synergies
Social psychology stresses the role of synergies as an important factor in team success, and
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) emphasized their importance for moral hazard in teams. Among
the many kinds of possible synergies, we focus here on two extreme versions. In the ﬁrst case,
agents are more eﬀective when working together than working when separately. That is, the
rate at which a success arrives if the project is good displays complementarities in their eﬀort
choices. In the second case, in which attention is restricted to two agents, agents have diﬀerent
37skills, so that, depending on the type of project, one skill, the other, both or neither might be
appropriate.
6.1 Complementarities
In this subsection, we assume that the instantaneous probability of a breakthrough, condi-







1/ρ, where ρ ∈ (0,1),
and, as before, capacity λ is normalized to 1. The instantaneous rate of arrival of a success in
case the project is good has the property of constant elasticity of substitution with respect to the
agents’ levels of eﬀort.15 The assumption that ρ is positive guarantees that limu−i→0fi(ui,u−i) >
0 for all ui > 0, where fi = ∂f/∂ui.16 The baseline model corresponds to the special case ρ = 1.









Due to the fact that limui→0 fi(ui,u−i) = ∞ for all u−i > 0, it is no longer possible that,
in equilibrium, some agents exert no eﬀort whatsoever while some other agents exert eﬀort.
No matter what the other agents do, the returns from some suﬃciently small amount of eﬀort
are arbitrarily large. As we shall see, this does not imply that the equilibrium is necessarily
symmetric.
This speciﬁcation captures the notion that by working together, agents are more productive
than by themselves. Indeed, observe that, in the team problem in which agents work coopera-
15Of course, there are many other technologies with the property that levels of eﬀort are imperfect substitutes
(for example f (u) = δ min{ui} + (1 − δ)maxj =i {uj}). The C.E.S. function provides the clearest comparison
with the baseline model, as shown in Theorem 6.
16Otherwise, there always exist trivial equilibria in which no agent exerts any eﬀort.
38tively, it is optimal to set ui = 1 for all i, so that f(ui,...,un) = n
1
ρ, up to the time at which the
common belief drops to the level n
− 1
ρα. That is, there is strictly more experimentation here than
in i’s single-decision problem (i.e., when u−i = 0). In this case, the instantaneous probability of
success is equal to ui, as in the baseline case, and eﬀort is only exerted at a maximal rate up to
the time at which the common belief reaches the threshold α.
As in our baseline case, it is more convenient to represent the equilibrium level of eﬀort in
terms of the common equilibrium belief at that time. However, recall that eﬀort is not observable,
and that eﬀort is a function of time only, while the common belief is a function of time and eﬀort,
which can be derived from the equilibrium strategies.
Theorem 6 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, in which the level of eﬀort exerted at
time t is given by












given the equilibrium value of pt. Eﬀort is positive and strictly decreasing, tending to 0 as t → ∞.
This result generalizes Theorem 1 in the natural way. With synergies as well, free-riding leads
to delay and eﬀort dwindles over time. The belief pt converges to n
1− 1
ρα, which corresponds,
here as well, to the eﬀort exerted in the team problem when the prize is divided by n. Observe
that this belief is no longer equal to the threshold in the single-player decision problem. As
mentioned above, in the single-player decision problem, eﬀort is exerted up to the point at which
the belief is equal to α. Given that α > n
1− 1
ρα, aggregate equilibrium eﬀort is higher with
synergies and tends to the eﬃcient level as the parameter ρ tends to zero. The threshold at
which eﬀort asymptotically stops, n
1− 1
ρα, is decreasing in n, unlike in the case without synergies
in which it was constant. Provided that the belief is low enough, eﬀort is greater with more
agents, although not compared to the ﬁrst-best level.
It is easy to derive the corresponding symmetric Markovian equilibrium in the observable


















where kn := n
1
ρ−1, which gives rise to the same asymptotic threshold as in the non-observable
case. It is easy to verify, as in Theorem 2, that the eﬀort exerted is less than in the non-observable
case, for any given degree of belief.
To discuss the asymmetric equilibria, it is simpler to assume that n = 2, an assumption
that is maintained throughout this subsection. As mentioned above, synergies ensure that there
cannot be an equilibrium in which some agent does not exert any eﬀort at all, while his partner








It is easy to verify that this function is strictly increasing for ρ > 1/2, so that its inverse function,
g−1, is well-deﬁned and increasing as well. Without loss of generality, assume that u1,0 ≥ u2,0,
i.e. agent 1 exerts at least as much eﬀort as agent 2 at the initial instant.
Theorem 7 For ρ < 1/2, there exists no asymmetric equilibrium. For ρ ≥ 1/2, there exists a
continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Each asymmetric equilibrium is uniquely identiﬁed by the
value of u1,0/u2,0, which is in (1,g−1(p/α)] if ρ > 1/2, and is unrestricted for ρ = 1/2.
The symmetric equilibrium corresponds to the special case in which u1,0/u2,0 = 1. In the proof
in the appendix, we further show that the aggregate eﬀort is strictly lower in any asymmetric
equilibrium than in the symmetric equilibrium for ρ > 1/2, and equal to it for ρ = 1/2. Agents
stop exerting eﬀort at the same ﬁnite time if ρ = 1/2, but never stop if ρ > 1/2. The roles of
agents are never reversed: because agent 1 exerts more eﬀort than agent 2 at the initial time, he
keeps on exerting more eﬀort throughout. Figure 6 displays the range of values of initial ratios
40σ0 := u1,0/u2,0 for which an asymmetric equilibrium exists, for a given prior p0 = p and a level
of complementarity ρ.










































Figure 6: Admissible initial values for asymmetric equilibria
As in the baseline model, there is a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and fairness: it is always best
for the team’s aggregate payoﬀ if the team members’ choices about how much eﬀort to exert
are, to a certain extent, asymmetrical when synergies are not too strong. However, as one would
expect, simulations show that the optimal degree of asymmetry decreases as the strength of the
synergies increases.
What if agents have diﬀerent costs? Suppose that α1 < α2, so that agent 1 is more eﬃcient.
There exists a continuum of equilibria, indexed by the initial ratio of eﬀort levels, σ0 = u1,0/u2,0,
which uniquely deﬁnes the equilibrium path. (Depending on p, there might be a bound on
the admissible values of σ0. The appendix contains a more formal discussion.) The equilibrium
trajectories of eﬀort can be decomposed into two time intervals. Initially, the more eﬃcient agent
works more than his counterpart. Afterwards, the opposite is true. Depending on the initial value
of σ0, one or the other interval might be empty. This ordering of roles can be understood in
41terms of the agents’ relative incentives to procrastinate. The more ineﬃcient agent stands to
lose less by procrastinating (the project is worth less to him, and so discounting his value is less
costly), and has more to gain (eﬀort being costlier for him, he appreciates more the potential
cost saving from procrastination). Therefore, if agents must “take turns,” he must be the second
agent.
The total amount of experimentation, as measured by the limit value of the belief p, is
maximized when the more eﬃcient agent works more throughout; more precisely, he must work
suﬃciently more for the ratio σ to reach asymptotically (α2/α1)1/(1−ρ), as the common belief
p tends to its limiting value α2((α2/α1)ρ/(1−ρ) + 1)1−1/ρ. This means that, not only are there
asymmetric equilibria that tend to the symmetric equilibrium as α2 → α1, but this is in particular
the case for the equilibrium that maximizes the amount of experimentation. Moreover, this
statement does not depend on the value parameter ρ. Therefore, the discontinuity between
equilibria of the baseline model with symmetric and asymmetric players is not robust to the
introduction of (an arbitrarily small level of) complementarities. The two panels of Figure 7
illustrate how the respective eﬀorts might vary with the initial value σ0.














































































Figure 7: Equilibria when α1  = α2.
426.2 Diﬀerent Skills
In this subsection, the baseline model is generalized as follows. Instead of the project’s being
simply good or bad, it may be any of four possible types. (1) It is good (type 0), and both agents
are equally able to achieve a breakthrough, as before. In this case, we maintain the assumption
that the arrival rate of a breakthrough has instantaneous probability u1,t + u2,t. (2 and 3) It
is of type i = 1,2, in which case only agent i’s eﬀort might lead to a breakthrough. That is,
the instantaneous probability of a breakthrough is now ui,t, independently of u−i,t. (4) It is bad
(type 3), and eﬀorts are then wasted, because breakthroughs are impossible.
The initial belief is now given by a vector p = (p0,p1,p2), where pk is the initial belief that
the project is of type k. More generally, we write pk
t for the equilibrium belief at time t that
the project is of type k, so that p3
t = 1 − p0
t − p1
t − p2
t, and we assume that p3 > 0.17 Let

























We assume that agents are symmetric, i.e. αi is independent of i. We focus ﬁrst on the case in
which p1 = p2.
Observe that it is no longer an equilibrium for only one agent to exert eﬀort throughout the
project. Indeed, if agent i = 1,2 works by himself, pi will decrease while pj will increase, where
j is the index of the other agent. That is, the absence of a breakthrough leads agent i to become
17The case p3 = 0 can be studied independently. In particular, when skills are perfectly negatively correlated
(p0 = p3 = 0, p1 = p2 = 1/2), as in Klein and Rady (2008), belief and eﬀort remain constant, with a level of
eﬀort equal to r(α−1 − (1/2)−1), which is the same eﬀort as in the baseline model for a belief p = 1/2.
43more pessimistic about his chances of making a breakthrough than agent j. Therefore, at the
point at which it does not pay for i to continue exerting eﬀort on his own, it would still be
proﬁtable for j to exert eﬀort.
It cannot be, either, that one agent works after another agent stops working, because the
agent that remains active would exert maximal eﬀort as soon he was working by himself, say
at time t. Yet the other agent would be unwilling to exert any eﬀort at time t − dt, for small
enough dt > 0. So when one agent works, both must work, and if they are patient enough, the
unique solution for equilibrium eﬀort is symmetric and interior. The restriction on the discount














which is assumed here. If the second inequality fails, eﬀort is identically zero in every equilibrium.
As stated, the problem is multidimensional. However, it turns out that it can be solved






p2, and ˜ p
3 :=
1 − 2C − 2α(1 − C) +
 
1 − 4α(1 − α)(1 − C)
2(1 − C)
.
Theorem 8 Assume p1 = p2 > 0. There exists a unique equilibrium, which is symmetric. In
this equilibrium, at time t, given the equilibrium value of p3























Eﬀort is positive for all t ≥ 0, and limt p3
t = ˜ p3.
The exact relationship between time t and belief p3
t is given in the appendix. Given this
result, it would appear that having diﬀerent skills does not fundamentally change the incentives
of agents to free-ride. As in the baseline model, the equilibrium reﬂects dilatory behavior. The
44project suﬀers a protracted delay and eﬀort dwindles over time. Indeed, it follows from the
theorem that limt→∞ ui,t = 0. As the common value p1 = p2 tends to zero, the eﬀort approaches
the symmetric equilibrium from Theorem 1. Therefore, introducing agent-speciﬁc skills restores
uniqueness and singles out the symmetric equilibrium in the limit.
Somewhat surprisingly, the limiting threshold ˜ p3 only depends on the prior belief p via a
one-dimensional statistic, C, in which it is increasing. One extreme case is obtained by taking
p1 = p2 to zero. We are then back to the baseline model, in which the belief 1 − p3 tends to α.
The other extreme case is obtained by taking p0 to zero. Skills are then entirely independent,
yet free-riding persists, because eﬀort is not maximal, and 1 − p3 tends to a higher threshold,
2α, which reﬂects the lower probability that a particular agent’s skill is the appropriate one.
If one agent is more likely to solve the problem that the other, in the sense that p1 > p2,
say, the equilibrium is unique as well. As we show in the appendix, along the equilibrium path,
the more “optimistic” agent (agent 1, here), starts by exerting maximal eﬀort by himself, up
to the point at which p1 = p2 (recall that p1 will decrease and p2 will increase), provided that
the resulting p3 is still lower than ˜ p3 (otherwise, agent 1 stops at some point, and neither agent
works thereafter). From that point on, both agents work symmetrically, as a function of p3, as
described in Theorem 8.
As we show in the appendix, the belief ˜ p3 has a natural interpretation. In the team problem
in which agents behave cooperatively, if a breakthrough is worth 1/2 to each agent, rather than
1, the optimal strategy proﬁle calls for both agents to exert maximal eﬀort up to the time t
at which p3
t = ˜ p3. This means that, as in the baseline model, the eﬀect of free-riding can be
decomposed into two components: (i) it aﬀects the total exertion of eﬀort in the usual way (˜ p3
falls short of the cooperative threshold); and (ii) it also aﬀects the timing of this exertion, as
described above. Figure 8 below illustrates the pattern of eﬀort and belief over time.

























































Figure 8: Eﬀort and beliefs with synergies
7 Multitask Projects
So far, we have presented a project as consisting of a single breakthrough. This is a gross
simpliﬁcation. Most projects involve several steps, or tasks, each of which must be completed for
the project to be a success. In this section, we adapt some of our earlier ﬁndings to the design
of optimal collaborations in the case of multiple tasks. For simplicity, we restrict attention to
the case of two tasks. In addition, given that the information structure is no longer trivial, we
require strategies to be sequentially rational. At any time, agents now observe whether a task
has been already (successfully) completed, which task it was, and at what time it was completed.
Neither the level nor the allocation of eﬀort is observed. We also assume that if both agents
work on one task simultaneously and the task gets completed at that instant, the speciﬁc agent
that is responsible for the success cannot be identiﬁed.18
The literature on project design has emphasized the relevance of the type of task for the
18This is not to say that the other case is uninteresting or intractable, but for the sake of concision, one or the
other modeling choice had to be made.
46eﬀect of social loaﬁng. Particular attention is devoted to the distinction between: conjunctive
tasks, all of which must be completed for the project to be a success; disjunctive tasks, only of
which must be completed to guarantee the success of the team (and completing any further task
provides no further beneﬁt); and additive tasks, for which the value of the project is additive in
the completion of the tasks (if only one project is completed, it is worth a payoﬀ normalized to
1 to each agent. If both are completed, each agent obtains a payoﬀ of 2.)
Another dimension along which projects vary relates to the timing of tasks. For some projects,
it is possible to work on two tasks simultaneously. For others, however, it is imperative to
complete a speciﬁc task before tackling the second one.
As before, we assume that each task is either good or bad. The type of task is statistically
independent across tasks and the initial probability that any given task is good is still denoted by
p. Eﬀort is additively separable across tasks. Agents are assumed to be identical, with marginal
cost α, and the total capacity for eﬀort normalized to 1. We describe here some equilibria. It is
easy to verify that these strategy proﬁles are indeed equilibria. Proofs are omitted and available
upon request.
7.1 The Team Problem
To understand the agents’ incentives better, it is useful to start with the case in which there
is only one agent (or, equivalently, in which agents act cooperatively). The following result holds
for all discount rates r ≥ 0. In all cases, eﬀort is exerted at the maximal rate until some point
at which eﬀort stops altogether. Our focus is on the allocation of eﬀort across tasks, so we omit
a discussion of these stopping times. The next proposition describes the optimal sequencing.
Proposition 1 (The Team solution) If n = 1, it is optimal to:
1. Work sequentially on tasks if they are conjunctive. If the prior probability p of each task
being good is identical across tasks, it is better to start with the task for which the parameter
47α is higher. If the cost parameter α is the same, it is better to start with the task for which
p is lower.
2. Split work equally across tasks if they are disjunctive and identical. If they are not identical,
eﬀort must be devoted exclusively to the task for which the diﬀerence p − α is larger, until
these diﬀerences are equalized, after which eﬀort must be split so as to maintain these
diﬀerences equal.
3. Tackle the tasks in any order, if tasks are additive and r = 0. If r > 0, eﬀort with additive
tasks should be allocated as in the disjunctive case.
The ﬁrst conclusion might ﬁrst sound a little surprising. However, recall that all conjunctive
tasks must be completed for the project to be successful. If one task is likely to be impossible to
complete, either because agents are quite pessimistic about it (low p) or because it is demanding
(high α), then it makes sense to avoid wasting eﬀort on the “easier” task by postponing tackling
it until it has been determined whether or not the more diﬃcult task can be completed.19
If tasks are disjunctive, on the other hand, it makes sense to devote the eﬀort to whichever
task yields the higher immediate return, that is, the task for which the spread p − α is larger.
This also holds for the additive case, but only because agents are impatient. Otherwise, since
tasks are independent, the order becomes irrelevant.
7.2 Sequential Conjunctive Tasks
We ﬁrst consider the case in which task 1 needs to be completed in order to start task 2.
Agents each receive a payoﬀ of 1 if both tasks are completed, and nothing otherwise.
Observe ﬁrst that, in the single-agent problem with only one task, which is worth v, the
agent would exert maximal eﬀort up to the point at which his belief p would satisfy pv = α, or
p = α/v. That is, increasing the prize has the same eﬀect as decreasing the marginal cost, and if
19Obviously, the threshold for the ﬁrst task in the sequential problem is not the threshold α for that task
considered on its own.
48agents had diﬀerent values for the project, the unique equilibrium would involve the agent with
the higher valuation exerting all the eﬀort.
Next, observe that, in the asymmetric equilibrium of the single-task project in which one
agent exerts eﬀort at a maximal rate and the other agent does not exert any eﬀort at all, the
idle agent has quite obviously a strictly higher payoﬀ.
It follows that, if agent i performs the last task all by himself, his continuation payoﬀ vi, at
the time at which the ﬁrst task is completed, is strictly lower than the payoﬀ of the other agent,
vj. From the point of view of performing the ﬁrst task, the second task can be summarized
by the continuation payoﬀs (v1,v2). Therefore, if agent i performs the last task by himself,
independently of the time at which the ﬁrst task is successfully completed, it must be that agent
j  = i is the only one exerting eﬀort on the ﬁrst task. With two tasks, there is no longer a
trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and fairness and there exists a unique equilibrium such that the last
task is performed by one agent only.
This reasoning can be extended to multiple tasks. With two tasks left, the agent who performs
the last task has a slightly higher continuation payoﬀ. This is because he will only exert eﬀort if
(and after) the other agent is successful. Therefore, he must be the one working by himself on
the ﬁrst of the three tasks. This reasoning can obviously be extended to any number of tasks:
there exists a unique equilibrium such that the last task is performed by one agent only; in this
equilibrium, agents alternate in executing tasks, as long as they are successful.
7.3 Conjunctive Tasks
Now consider the case in which the two tasks are conjunctive (i.e., the payoﬀ is awarded only
upon completion of both). However, there are no restrictions on the timing of players’ eﬀorts.
We focus on the case in which players are symmetric and suﬃciently patient, and discuss the
following two equilibria.20
20The speciﬁcation of the appropriate bound on r is omitted here.
49Proposition 2 (Conjunctive Tasks) If agents are suﬃciently patient, the following are pure-
strategy equilibria of the game with two tasks.
1. Agents work sequentially, each on one task. Agent 2 begins to work only if, and after, agent
1 has completed the ﬁrst task successfully .
2. Agents work simultaneously, each on one task. Agents exert maximal eﬀort until some time
T, at which they stop working. Upon completing a task, an agent stops working, while the
other one keeps on exerting maximal eﬀort up to some time.
In the equilibrium with sequential eﬀorts, beliefs eventually reach the eﬃcient thresholds. In
fact, the ﬁrst agent works until his beliefs oﬀset the payoﬀ from having the second agent complete
the remaining one. After and if the ﬁrst agent has completed the task, the second agent works
until the beliefs reach α, because his value from a success is equal to 1. Furthermore, both agents
exert maximal eﬀort, which makes this equilibrium the most eﬃcient noncooperative solution.
The equilibrium with simultaneous work and specialization is supported by the threat that,
if an agent is successful after time T, he is required to work alone on the remaining task, up to
the appropriate thresholds. As agents work, they become increasingly pessimistic about their
partner’s chances of completing the other task. This reduces the value of completing their own
task, so that the belief threshold at which they would stop actually increases over time. This
threshold is reached when α/p equals the expected value from having the other agent work alone
on the remaining task, starting from a belief p. However, if a task gets completed, the remaining
agent works until the usual threshold p = α. Therefore, this equilibrium is less eﬃcient than
the sequential one, purely in terms of total eﬀort (because both individual thresholds increase
over time). The continuation strategy of stopping work after a success is eﬃcient both from an
ex post perspective (because having only agent work on one task is eﬃcient), and from an ex
ante perspective. It is of critical importance that each agent knows that he is alone working
on his task. Otherwise, he would be tempted to wait for the other agent to complete his own
task. Continuation play prescribes the strongest possible punishment for deviating. In fact, if
50the ﬁrst success is obtained after the time at which both agents were supposed to stop, the
ﬁrst agent to succeed must also complete the remaining task. This speciﬁcation is admittedly
extreme, although the equilibrium outcome can also be supported by weaker ones (under stronger
restrictions on the parameters).
Finally, there are also several equilibria with simultaneous and non maximal eﬀort levels.
For instance, agents use the symmetric (baseline) equilibrium strategy on task 1, given the
continuation payoﬀ (which aﬀects the limit threshold) and then, if successful, on task 2.
7.4 Additive Tasks
Now consider the case in which tasks are additive and payoﬀs are given by the total number
of successes.
Proposition 3 (Additive Tasks) If players are suﬃciently patient, the following are pure-
strategy equilibria of the game with two tasks.
1. Agents work sequentially, each on one task. Agent 2 begins to work only if, and after, agent
1 has completed his task.
2. Agents work simultaneously, each on one task. Agents exert eﬀort at the maximal rate
until the single-task threshold p = α is reached. Upon obtaining a success, an agent stops
working, while the other one completes his task.
In the equilibrium in which agents work simultaneously, both agents work until they reach
the single-task threshold, because the value of each success is independent of their beliefs about
other tasks. This also deters an agent from delaying his eﬀorts to until after his partner has
completed his task. Unlike in the case of conjunctive tasks, this equilibrium is more eﬃcient
than the sequential one. In fact, both equilibria involve both agents working until the single-
project threshold, but the sequential one has a longer expected completion time.
51There also exists a symmetric equilibrium without maximal eﬀort. Agents can work on the
two tasks both sequentially or simultaneously. In either case, agents adopt the equilibrium
strategies described in our baseline model with one task. The equilibrium with sequential eﬀorts
requires a minimal level of patience to ensure that agents actually want to wait for one task to
be completed (or abandoned) before starting to work on the other.
7.5 Disjunctive Tasks
Now consider the case in which projects are disjunctive, which means that success in any one
project ends the game with a unit payoﬀ for both agents.
Proposition 4 (Disjunctive Tasks) If agents are suﬃciently patient, the following are equi-
libria of the game with two tasks.
1. Agents work simultaneously, each on one task. Each agent exerts a lower amount of eﬀort
than in the case of a common single-task project.
2. Agents work simultaneously and divide their eﬀorts equally across tasks.
As in the team problem, agents maintain the spread p−α constant across tasks. In the equi-
librium with agents working each on one task, the incentives to procrastinate are stronger than
in our baseline case. By shirking today, an agent “freezes” his beliefs about his task. Exerting
eﬀort tomorrow will therefore be relatively more productive. Analogously, in the equilibrium in
which eﬀorts are divided across tasks, the total amount of eﬀort that is exerted on each task is
lower than in the equilibrium with division of labor. Indeed, suppose that the total amounts of
eﬀort exerted on each task were equal to the case of division of labor. Holding ﬁxed the eﬀort
devoted to one task, each agent would be indiﬀerent between working and not working at all on
the other task, provided his partner does not collaborate on it. Since his partner is now exerting
positive eﬀort on both tasks, each player then has an incentive to free-ride and reduce his eﬀort,
relative to the equilibrium with division of labor.
528 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that moral hazard distorts not only the amount of eﬀort, but also its timing.
Agents work too little, too late. Downsizing the team might help, provided that agents’ skills
are not too complementary. On the other hand, increasing transparency might aggravate the
delay. Setting an appropriate deadline is beneﬁcial, in as much as the reduction in delay more
than oﬀsets the further reduction in eﬀort.
The model that we have considered is quite stylized, partly for reasons of simplicity, partly
for tractability. We discuss here how relaxing two of the assumptions aﬀects the main results.
Learning-By-Doing: In practice, agents do not only learn from their past eﬀort whether they
can succeed, but also how they can succeed. Such learning-by-doing can be modelled as in
Doraszelski (2003), by assuming that each agent i accumulates knowledge according to
˙ zi,t = ui,t − δzi,t,
with zi,0 = 0. If the project is good, a breakthrough occurs with instantaneous probability
 
i hi,t, where
hi,t = ui,t + ρz
φ
i,t.
The baseline model obtains if we let δ → ∞, or ρ → 0. While the ﬁrst-order conditions
given by Pontryagin’s theorem cannot be solved in closed-form, they can be solved numerically.
It is no longer the case that eﬀort is positive forever (at least, if φ is not too large). This
should not be too surprising, because accumulated knowledge is a substitute for actual eﬀort,
so that it serves as its proxy once its stock is suﬃciently large relative to the public belief. The
probability of a breakthrough evolves as in the baseline model. It decreases over time, and
remains always positive (which is obvious, since accumulated knowledge never fully depreciates).
Eﬀort decreases continuously and reaches zero in ﬁnite time. The asymptotic belief is now lower
than α: although eﬀort may (or may not) stop before this threshold is reached, the belief keeps
53decreasing afterwards, because of the accumulated knowledge. Figure 9 depicts the locus of
beliefs and knowledge stocks at which eﬀort stops, and shows one possible path for the public
belief, from zi,0 = 0 to the point at which all eﬀort stops, for two possible values of φ. The dotted
lines represent the evolution of p and z once eﬀort has stopped. As one would expect, time until


































Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.1, α=0.25, ρ=1/φ, φ=1/3



































Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.1, α=0.25, ρ=1/φ, φ=3
Figure 9: Public belief and accumulated knowledge, as a function of φ
which eﬀort stops grows without bound as we approach the baseline model (i.e., if ρ → 0 or
δ → ∞).
Convex Costs: Throughout the analysis, we have maintained the assumption that the cost
is linear in the level of eﬀort. While this aﬀords tractability, it is natural to ask whether the
ﬁndings are robust to this assumption. This is especially relevant given that, with linear cost,
agents are actually indiﬀerent between any level of eﬀort at a symmetric equilibrium, so that
such an equilibrium has the ﬂavor of a mixed-strategy equilibrium, for which comparative statics
are sometimes counterintuitive.
While it is no longer possible to obtain closed-form formulas for the solution of the Euler-
Lagrange equations that characterize the interior solution in the case of nonlinear cost, we present
here a few numerical illustrations for the case of cost functions that are power functions, i.e.
c(ui) = c u
γ
i , γ > 1,c > 0. We focus here on the case of symmetric agents, and the instantaneous
54probability of a breakthrough is still given by the sum of the eﬀorts. That is, the model is
otherwise identical to the baseline case.
















































1Parameter Values r=2, c(u)=u
γ/9, γ∈[2.1, 3.7], p
0=.9, n=2











































Parameter Values r=2, c(u)=u
γ/9, γ∈[2.1, 3.7] p
0=.9, n=2
Figure 10: Cost of delay and payoﬀs with convex cost
The ﬁrst remark is that convex costs are similar to synergies, in the sense that, with more
agents, it is possible to achieve the same total level of eﬀort at a lower cost (because dividing
the same total eﬀort across more agents lowers the overall cost, when the cost is convex). This
should favor larger teams, and we might expect that the amount of eﬀort exerted by an agent
does not decrease as quickly, as we increase the number of agents, relative to the baseline model.
In turn, this might lead to the time within which a breakthrough is expected to occur being
reduced (conditional on a breakthrough occurring in ﬁnite time) for larger teams, while the
impact on payoﬀ is ambiguous.21 Indeed, this is precisely what we ﬁnd, provided the convexity
is suﬃciently pronounced. See Figure 10 for an illustration of welfare and the cost of delay, and
see the left panel of Figure 11 below, which shows that the eﬀort path becomes ﬂatter as the
convexity becomes stronger (the cost functions have been normalized so that the value of the
single-decision problem remains constant).
The other ﬁnding that seems to depend signiﬁcantly on the linear cost structure is the dis-
21Such conditioning is meaningful, since the overall eﬀort over time is still independent of n.


























































































Figure 11: Eﬀort with convex cost with or without a deadline
continuity in equilibrium levels of eﬀort when there is a deadline. Indeed, with convex costs, one
suspects that the equilibrium eﬀort should be a continuous function of time. This is indeed the
case, as shown in the right panel of Figure 11. Furthermore, for a deadline that is far enough in
the future, the graph for eﬀort is approximately U-shaped.
Incomplete Information: In many applications, uncertainty pertains not only to the quality
of the project, but also to the productivity of agents. That is, the value of the parameter α of
each agent might be unknown. We may model this by assuming that α ∈ {αL,αH} is drawn
independently across players, with αL < αH, and some probability q0 that each agent is of the
low type αL, that is, that his productivity is high.
Solving for an equilibrium is diﬃcult, because agents are updating on both the quality of
the project and the productivity of their opponent, and this updating depends on the eﬀort
choices, which are private information. While we have not attempted to establish uniqueness,
the following constitutes a symmetric Bayes Nash equilibrium path (for those values of the
parameters for which the solution is not trivial). The low-type (high-productivity) agent starts
by exerting eﬀort by himself. As time passes, he quickly becomes more pessimistic, while the
high-type agent, who does not work during that time, does not update his belief downward as
fast (the lack of success is not as surprising to him because he does not work). That is, the
56private beliefs of the two agent’s types about the quality of the project diverge. At some time,
the relative optimism of the high-cost agent more than oﬀsets his cost disadvantage and he starts
exerting eﬀort. Simultaneously, the low-cost agent stops working once and for all. The high-
cost agent’s eﬀort then dwindles over time and his belief converges asymptotically to αH, his
Marshallian threshold. Because of his initial eﬀort level, the private belief of the low-cost agent
remains forever below the high-cost agent’s and converges asymptotically to a level below his
own Marshallian threshold, namely αL. The eﬀort trajectories in such an equilibrium are shown
in Figure 11 below.22
An interesting open question is what happens when eﬀort is observable. Since the level of
eﬀort conveys information about the agent’s type, this might give rise to ratcheting, as low-cost
agents might want to hide their private information. This might further depress the exertion of
eﬀort in the observable case, but a careful analysis is left for future research.




















































Figure 12: Eﬀort under incomplete information
22Note that eﬀort can be increasing over time. This is due to the fact that, because the probability that agent
−i assigns to agent i being of the low type decreases over time, the eﬀort agent −i needs to exert to keep player
i indiﬀerent between exerting eﬀort or not might actually increase.
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62Appendix
A Proofs for Section 4





i ui,t = −˙ pt/(1 − pt). It follows that pt
 
i ui,t = dlog(1 − pt)/dt. We can then rewrite




i ui,s+r)ds) in expression (3) as exp(−rt)(1−p)/(1−pt), and




















j =i uj,t. Applying integration by parts to the objective and ignoring all irrelevant













Making the further change of variable xt = ln((1 − pt)/pt), and deﬁning β := 1/α − 1, agent i




−rtdt, such that ˙ xt = ui,t + u−i,t,
over functions ui,t in [0,λ], given the function u−i,t.





= (−xt + e
−xt(u−i,t/r − β))e
−rt + ˆ γi,t (ui,t + u−i,t).
It is easy to see that no agent exerts eﬀort if pt < α (consider the original objective function:
if pt < α, then choosing ui,t = 0 is clearly optimal). We therefore assume that p > α, which
is equivalent to x0 < lnβ, where x0 = ln((1 − ¯ p)/¯ p). Assumption (4) on the discount rate is
equivalent to 1 + e−x0(λ/r − β) > 0.
63(Necessary Conditions.) Deﬁne γi,t := ˆ γi,tert. By Pontryagin’s principle, there must exist a
continuous function γi such that, for each i,
1. (maximum principle) For each t ≥ 0, ui,t maximizes γi,t(ui,t + u−i,t);
2. (evolution of the co-state variable) The function γ satisﬁes ˙ γi,t = rγt+1+e−xt(u−i,t/r−β);
3. (transversality condition) If x∗ is the optimal trajectory, lim
t→∞
γi,t(x∗
t −xt) ≤ 0 for all feasible
trajectories xt.
The transversality condition follows here from Kamihigashi (2001). Since there is a co-state
variable γi for each player, we are led to consider a phase diagram in Rn+1, with dimensions
representing γ1,...,γn, and x.
(Candidate Equilibrium.) We ﬁrst show that the candidate equilibrium strategy u∗
i,t and the
corresponding beliefs function x∗
t satisfy the necessary conditions. Consider a strategy generating
a trajectory that starts at (γ1,...,γn,x0) = (0,...,0,x0), and has ui,t = u∗
i,t := r(β−ext)/(n − 1).
This implies that γi,t = 0 along the trajectory. Observe that u∗
i,t > 0 as long as xt < lnβ, and is
decreasing in t, with limit 0 as t → ∞. Indeed, the solution is
x
∗




i,t = (rβ /(n − 1))/((βe−x0−1)−1e(n/(n−1))rβt+1), which corresponds to expression
(7) in the text. Indeed, this trajectory has xt → lnβ, and γ∗
i,t = 0, for all t.







as a reference to eliminate other
trajectories, by virtue of the transversality condition. We shall divide all possible paths into
several subsets:
1. Consider paths that start with γj ≥ 0 for all j, with strict inequality γi > 0 for some i.
Since γi > 0, ui = λ, and so ˙ γj > 0 for all j. So we might as well consider the case γj > 0
64for all j. Then for all j, we have uj > 0 and γj strictly increasing. It follows that γ1,...,γn,
and x all diverge to +∞. Given the reference path along which x converges, such paths
violate the transversality condition.
2. Consider paths that start with γi ≤ 0 for all i, with strict inequality γi < 0 for all but one
agent j. We then have u−j = 0. Since p > α implies that rγj + 1 − βe−x0 < 0, it follows
that ˙ γj < 0, and we might as well assume that γi < 0 for all i. So we have ui = 0 for
all i, and x remains constant, and all γi diverge to −∞. Since x0 is less than lnβ, the
limit of our reference trajectory, this again violates the transversality condition. The same
argument rules out any path that enters this subset of the state space, provided it does so
for xt < lnβ. However, we do not rule out the case of γ = (γ1,...,γn) ≤ 0 with two or
more indices j s.t. γj = 0 and u−j > 0.
3. Consider paths that start with some γi < 0 for all agents i  = j, and with γj > 0. Assume
further that rγj + 1 − βe−x0 ≥ 0. Because uj > 0, ˙ xt > 0 and so we might as well assume
that ˙ γj ≥ rγj + 1 − βe−x0 > 0. It then follows that uj > 0 forever, and so γj diverges to
+∞, as does x. This again violates the transversality condition. If there is more than one
j such that γj > 0, then u−j ≥ λ, and 1+e−x0(λ/r−β) > 0 implies that a fortiori ˙ γj > 0.
The same argument then applies.
4. Consider paths that start with some γi < 0 for all i  = j, and with γj > 0. Assume further
that rγj + 1 − βe−x0 < 0. Since uj > 0 as long as γj > 0, the trajectory must eventually
leave this subset of parameters, either because γj ≤ 0, and then we are back to case 2, or
because ˙ γj ≥ 0, and then we are back to case 3. If the trajectory enters one of the previous
subsets, it is not admissible for the reasons above. Therefore, the only case left is if this
trajectory hits (γ1,...,γn,x) ≤ (0,...,0,lnβ) with at least two indices j such that γj = 0.
This is case 5. Notice that if there were more than one index j for which γj > 0, then
u−j ≥ λ, and 1 + e−x0(λ/r − β) > 0 would imply ˙ γj > 0 even if rγj + 1 − βe−x0 < 0,
65bringing us back to case 3.
5. Consider paths that start with (γ1,...,γn,x) ≤ (0,...,0,lnβ) with at least two j such that
γj = 0. Let At = {j : γj,t = 0}. Then there is a unique solution u∗
j,t(|A|) := r(β −
ext)/(|A| − 1), such that ˙ γj = 0 for all j ∈ A (as long as xt < lnβ, since u∗
j,t = 0 when
xt = lnβ). Along this trajectory, xt → lnβ. Furthermore, the eﬀort levels must switch
to u∗
j,t(|At| + 1) for all j ∈ A ∪ {i} whenever γi = 0 for i  ∈ At. Similarly if two or more
i  ∈ At hit γi = 0 at the same time. We show this by ruling out all other cases. Any
policy with u−j < u∗
−j (|A|) for all j implies ˙ γj < 0, leading to case 2. Any policy with
u−j > u∗
−j (|A|) leads to case 1. Finally, any policy diﬀerent from u∗
j (|A|) can lead to two
or more γj > 0 (case 3), or to a single γj > 0 (cases 3 and 4). This leaves us with the only
possible scenario, uj = u∗
j (|A|) for all j ∈ A, and this is precisely the candidate trajectory
examined earlier.
We have thus eliminated all but one family of paths. These paths start with at most one agent
i exerting ui = λ, then switching (before the beliefs have reached lnβ) to two or more agents
(including i) who play the reference strategy u∗
i,t(|At|), as if only agents i ∈ At were present in
the team. At any point in time before the beliefs have reached the threshold α, more agents
may be added to A (but not subtracted). In that case, the policy switches to the appropriate
strategy u∗
j (|A|). That is, all candidate equilibria have several phases. In the ﬁrst phase, one
player exerts eﬀort alone. In the subsequent phases, all (active) players exert eﬀort at equal
levels, adding new players at any point in time. Of course, there are extreme cases in which some
phase is non-existent. Therefore, the only symmetric equilibrium is one in which |A0| = n, that
is, all players exert eﬀort u∗
j (n) from the start.
(Suﬃciency.) We are left with proving that these candidate equilibria are indeed equilibria.
While the optimization programme described above is not necessarily concave in x, observe that,









−rtdt s.t. ˙ qt = −qt(ui,t + u−i,t).
so that the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in q, and suﬃciency then follows from the Arrow
suﬃciency theorem (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987), Thm. 3.17). Therefore, all these paths
are equilibria. ￿
Proof of Lemma 1: (1.) From expression (7), it is clear that individual eﬀort is decreasing in
t, and that for a ﬁxed t, u∗
i,t is increasing in r and ¯ p.
(2.) Aggregate eﬀort is measured by x∗
t, since we know ˙ xt =
 
i ui,t. Diﬀerentiating expression
(8), it follows that the equilibrium x∗
t is decreasing in α and in n, and that limt→∞ x∗
t = lnβ for
all n.










where s = nrβt/(n − 1). It is therefore independent of n. Let τ ∈ R+∪{∞} denote the random
time at which a breakthrough arrives. The conditional distribution of arrival times t for a team
of size n is given by
Gn (t) :=
  ˜ s(t,n)
0
f (s)ds
   ∞
0
f (s)ds ,
where ˜ s(t,n) := nrβt/(n − 1). Since ˜ s is decreasing in n, the probability of a success arriving
before time t is also decreasing in n. In other words, the conditional distributions of arrival
times Gn (t) are ranked by ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. As a consequence, the conditional
expected time of a breakthrough is increasing in n.
(3.) Substituting expressions (8) and (7) for x∗
t and u∗








































which is increasing in n, since y ∈ [0,1] implies the integrand is decreasing in n. Furthermore,
the un-normalized payoﬀ is independent of r. The other comparative statics follow upon diﬀer-
entiation of V . ￿
Two-player, asymmetric case: Assume that players are asymmetric, in the sense that α1 <
α2, which implies lnβ1 > lnβ2. The nontriviality condition becomes now that p > α1, while we
maintain the patience assumption 1 + e−x0(λ/r − βi) > 0.
(Necessary Conditions.) There must exist a continuous function γi such that, for each i,
1. ui,t maximizes γi,t(ui,t + u−i,t).
2. ˙ γi,t = rγt + 1 + e−xt(u−i,t/r − βi).
3. If x∗ is the optimal trajectory, lim
t→∞
γi,t(x∗
t − xt) ≤ 0 for all feasible trajectories xt.
(Candidate Equilibrium.) We consider a phase diagram in R3, with dimensions γ1, γ2,
and x. Consider the trajectory that starts from some (γ1,γ2,x), with γ1 > 0, γ2 < 0 and
˙ γ1 = rγ1 + 1 − β1e−x < 0 (i.e. it has u1,t = λ and u2,t = 0 to begin with) such that it reaches
(¯ γ1, ¯ γ2, ¯ x), with ¯ γ1 = 0, ¯ γ2 < 0, ˙ γ1 = ˙ γ2 = 0, and ¯ x = lnβ1. At this point (¯ γ1, ¯ γ2, ¯ x), ui,t = 0 for
all t, and the trajectory stops.
(Uniqueness.) To prove that this is the unique equilibrium outcome, we divide this space
into several subsets.
681. Consider any path that starts with γi> 0,γj ≥ 0. This case is analogous to case (1) in the
proof of Theorem 1.
2. Consider paths that start with γi< 0,γj ≤ 0. There are several subcases, depending on
the initial condition.
(a) rγk + 1 − βke−x > 0 for either k = i or j. Then γk diverges to +∞, and so must x.
This violates the transversality condition.
(b) rγ2 + 1 − β2e−x = 0. Given that x0 < lnβ1, it follows that ˙ γ1 < 0 (unless possibly
γ2 = 0 and u2 > 0, in which case, however, ˙ x > 0 and so the trajectory immediately
enters the previous subcase). So γ1 diverges to −∞, and x remains constant at a level
strictly below x. Again, this violates the transversality condition.
(c) rγ2 + 1 − β2e−x < 0. As in the previous case, it follows that ˙ γ1 < 0 (with the same
caveat as before), so γ1 diverges to −∞, and so does γ2; x remains constant, and
again, the transversality condition is violated.
3. Consider paths that start with γi< 0,γj > 0, and rγj + 1 − βje−x0 ≥ 0. This case is
analogous to (3.) in the proof of Theorem 1.
4. Consider paths that start with γi< 0,γj > 0, rγj+1−βje−x0 < 0. There are two subcases:
(a) i = 1. Because u2 > 0 as long as γ2 > 0, so that ˙ x > 0, the trajectory must eventually
leave this subset of parameters. Note that it must do so for a value of x no larger
than lnβ2. The only possibility that has not already been ruled out previously is if
this trajectory hits (γ1,γ2,xt) = (0,0,xt), for some xt ≤ lnβ2. This is ruled out in
case 5.
(b) i = 2. Since u1 > 0, ˙ x > 0; hence, here as well, we must eventually leave this region.
The cases not covered so far are if the trajectory hits (γ1,γ2,xt) = (0,0,x) for some
x < lnβ1 (ruled out in case 5), or if it hits (γ1,γ2,xt) = (0,γ2,lnβ1) for some γ2 ≤ 0.
69If γ2 > γ2, then as in case 3, γ2 must diverge to +∞, and so must x, violating the
transversality condition. If instead γ2 < γ2, then u1 = 0 identically thereafter, in
which case γ2,t → −∞, and player 2 never exerts eﬀort. This outcome is identical
to the one in our reference trajectory. In fact, if player 2 exerts any eﬀort, x must
increase at some point, from which point on γ1 will diverge to +∞, and so will x,
violating the transversality condition.
5. Consider paths that start from (γ1,γ2,xt) = (0,0,x), for some x ≤ lnβ1. There are two
subcases:
(a) x ∈ (β2,β1). Then ˙ γ2 > 0; if also ˙ γ1 ≥ 0, we are back to the ﬁrst case; if instead,
˙ γ1 < 0, we are in the third case. Both cases have already been ruled out.
(b) x ≤ lnβ2. Then there is a unique solution u∗
2,t, given in Theorem 1, such that ˙ γi= 0.
Observe that, unlike in the symmetric case, u∗
2 > 0 for all x ≤ lnβ2. For uj > u∗
j,
˙ γi> 0. There are four cases to consider. Either ˙ γi> 0, ˙ γj ≥ 0. Then the region
covered in case 1 is entered, and such a path cannot satisfy the necessary conditions.
Or ˙ γi≤ 0, ˙ γj < 0, but then the region covered in case 2 is entered, and again this path
can be ruled out. Or ˙ γi> 0, but ˙ γj < 0, for some i = 1,2, but this would lead to
one of the two regions covered in case 4, and given the dynamics there, such a region
cannot be entered for a positive interval of time starting from (0,0,x). Or, ﬁnally,
ui = u∗
i for both i = 1,2, but since u∗
2 > 0, ˙ x > 0, and so, as in the case 3, γ2 must
diverge to +∞, and so must x, violating the transversality condition.
(Suﬃciency.) We have thus eliminated all but one outcome: the one in which the strongest
player experiments alone as long as he ﬁnds it proﬁtable to do so. Suﬃcient conditions did not
rely on symmetry, hence this path is an equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Theorem 2: Subtracting the equilibrium value of eﬀort in the observable case from











This term is positive, as can be seen as follows. Let f(p) be the term in brackets. This function
is convex, as f′′(p) = α/(p(1−p)2), and its derivative at p = α is equal to (1−α)−1 > 0. Hence,
f is increasing in p over the range [α,1], and it is equal to 0 at p = α, so it is positive over this
range. ￿
B Proofs for Section 5
Throughout, let x := ln
1−p
p , so that in particular x0 = ln
1−p
p , and β = α−1 − 1.
Proof of Lemma 2: (Preliminaries.) Consider the objective function under a deadline T.
We again use the fact that ˙ pt = −pt(1 − pt)
 
i ui,t, and hence pt
 
i ui,t = dlog(1 − pt)/dt. We






























































such that ˙ xt = ui,t + u−i,t,
71over functions ui,t in [0,1], given the function u−i,t.





:= (−xt + e
−xt(u−i,t/r − β))e
−rt + ˆ γi,t (ui,t + u−i,t),
and the salvage value is given by
φ(x,T) := e
−rT (β (1 + e
x) + x)/r.
We now drop the subscript i and, as in the proof of Theorem 1, we assume that p > α, which
is equivalent to x0 < lnβ. We also maintain the assumption on the discount rate given in (4),
namely 1 + e−x0(1/r − β) > 0.
(Necessary Conditions.) Deﬁne γi,t := ˆ γi,tert. By Pontryagin’s principle, there must exist a
continuous function γi,t for each i, such that,
1. ui,t maximizes γi,t(ui,t + u−i,t);
2. ˙ γi,t = rγt + 1 + e−xt(u−i,t/r − β);
3. γi,T = φx (xT,T) = (βe−xT − 1)/r.
We again consider a phase diagram in Rn+1, with dimensions γ1,...,γn, and x.
(Candidate Equilibrium.) Our candidate equilibrium strategy u∗
i,t generates a trajectory that
starts at (γ1,...,γn,x0) = (0,...,0,x0), and has ui,t = u∗
i,t := r(β − ext)/(n − 1) for 0 ≤ t ≤ ˜ T,
and ui,t = u∗
i,t := 1 for ˜ T < t ≤ T. This implies γi,t = 0 for t ≤ ˜ T and γi,t > 0 for t > ˜ T. The
switching time ˜ T is given by the solution to
T − ˜ T − T(x ˜ T) = 0. (9)





(n + r)(β − ex)
β + 1
.
The equilibrium beliefs x∗
t are given by the solution to ˙ xt = nu∗
i,t. Therefore, for all t ≤ ˜ T, we
have x∗
t = lnβ−ln(1+(βe−x0 −1)e−(n/(n−1))rβt), and for all t > ˜ T we have x∗
t = x∗
˜ T +n(t− ˜ T). It
is immediate to verify that T(x) < Tn (x), which is the time it takes for beliefs to reach α when
n agents exert maximal eﬀort: stopping occurs before beliefs have gone down to the Marshallian
threshold.
We ﬁrst verify that our candidate strategy is an equilibrium. For all t ≤ ˜ T, agents exert
eﬀort at the interior level u∗
t > 0. At time ˜ T, agents switch to maximal eﬀort. When u∗
t = 1,
necessary condition 2 implies ˙ γ ˜ T > 0, and hence γt > 0 for all t ∈ (˜ T,T]. Finally, continuity
of the function γ∗
t requires that γ∗
˜ T = 0. We therefore need to verify that the solution to the
following diﬀerential equation,
˙ γt = rγt + 1 + e
−x∗
t((n − 1)/r − β),
with boundary condition γT = (βe−x∗
T −1)/r, is equal to zero at t = ˜ T. Notice that γT is positive
because xT ≤ lnβ. Using the fact that x∗
t = x∗

























The continuity of γ∗
t is veriﬁed by evaluating (10) at t = ˜ T, and setting the right-hand side equal
to zero. We then obtain exactly equation (9), which deﬁnes ˜ T.
If T (x0) ≥ T, then γt > 0 for all t, and agents exert u∗
t ≡ 1. This implies γ∗
t is given by
(10), where we replace x∗
˜ T with x0. It then suﬃces to verify that γ∗
0 > 0. Indeed, this is the case,
73because the right-hand side of (10) is increasing in t, decreasing in T, and it would be equal to
zero at t = 0 with a deadline of T (x0) > T.
(Uniqueness.) We now rule out all other symmetric paths. Suppose that, in equilibrium,
agents choose eﬀort ut = 1 at some time t1 < ˜ T. This would imply γt1 ≥ 0. However, if
ut1 = 1, then necessary condition 2 and assumption (4) on the discount rate imply ˙ γt1 > 0.
Therefore, we might as well consider the case of γt1 > 0. In this case, agents exert maximal
eﬀort, and γt increases from time t on. However, let xt = xt1 + n(t − t1), and consider the
solution to the diﬀerential equation ˙ γt = rγt +1+e−xt((n − 1)/r −β) with boundary condition
γT = (βe−xT − 1)/r. Again, the solution γt will be strictly increasing. Furthermore, we will
have γ ˜ T = 0 and therefore γt1 < 0, since t1 < ˜ T, contradicting the assumption that γt1 ≥ 0.
Now suppose agents continue to exert eﬀort at the interior levels of ut = r(β − ext)/(n − 1)
for t > ˜ T. Denote the switching time to maximal eﬀort by t2 > ˜ T, with γt2 = 0. The implied
path of γ∗
t, given the transversality condition, would then imply γt2 > 0, which contradicts the
assumption of interior eﬀort levels for t ≤ t2.
Finally, suppose that agents choose eﬀort ut = 0 at any time t3. This requires γt3 ≤ 0.
However, γt3 ≤ 0 and ut3 = 0 also imply ˙ γt3 < 0. Therefore, we consider the case of γt < 0. In
this case, agents exert no eﬀort, and γt decreases for all t ≥ t3. In particular, this implies γT < 0,
which violates the transversality condition. Indeed, since xt < lnβ (because ut = 0 from time t3
on), the transversality condition requires γT > 0.
(Suﬃciency.) The suﬃcient conditions in the proof of Theorem 1 did not rely on the inﬁnite
horizon, so this path is an equilibrium. ￿
Proof of Theorem 3: Let Vi(p) := Vi(p,T(p)). If the deadline is such that eﬀort switches to 1
at time ˜ T, the payoﬀ of agent i is then
Vi(˜ T) := (1 − p)








−r ˜ T V (p ˜ T)
1 − p ˜ T
 
,
74where pt solves ˙ pt = −pt(1−pt)nu∗
i,t, p0 = p. Taking derivatives with respect to ˜ T, and considering










α((n − 1)p + r) − pr
(n − α)(n − 1)p2
 
(n − α)p − α(n − p)
 
(n − α)p









































it is optimal to have agents choose level of eﬀort u = 1 as long as possible, the optimal value
is ˜ T = 0: agents should be given a deadline for which it is optimal to exert at a maximal rate
immediately.
Finally, diﬀerentiating T (¯ p) with respect to r, one can show that −∂T /∂r is exactly equal to
expression (11), and so the optimal deadline is increasing in the discount rate.





































over functions ui such that ˙ x =
 
j uj. Applying Pontryagin’s principle gives
˙ w − rw = −α(re
x + r + u−i),
which generalizes the earlier formula for w = 1. Note that this formula will hold even if u = 1 over
some interval, as the principal cannot gain from giving agents strict rather than weak incentives
to exert maximal eﬀort.
Proof of Theorem 4 (Agents’ Optimal Wage): Agents induce symmetric levels of eﬀort



















x + r + (n − 1)ut) = ˙ w,
nut = ˙ x.












s.t. ˙ x = nut, ˙ w = rw − α(re
x + r + (n − 1)ut),
e






76Associate the co-state µ to the constraint ˙ w = rw−α(rex+r+(n − 1)u), σ to the isoperimetric
constraint k0 =
  ∞
0 e−xe−rtdt and γ to ˙ x = nu. Given the constraint u ≤ 1, with associated









−rt + γnu + µ(rw − α(re
x + r + (n − 1)u)) + λ(1 − u),
with λ ≥ 0 and λ(1 − u) = 0. So µ = µ0e−rt, and
γn − αµ(n − 1) − λ = 0.
Observe that, if λ = 0 over some interval, then γ = αn−1
n µ0e−rt and therefore ˙ γ = −rαn−1
n µ0e−rt.
But we would then have
−˙ γ = −
 
−e











−x (v − α − σ) − α − αµ0re
x,
from which it follows that x is constant over that interval, a contradiction. So λ > 0 and u = 1.
Hence, x = x0 + nt (or more precisely, on any subinterval on which u = 1), and we obtain the
following ordinary diﬀerential equation (hereafter, ODE) for the wage:
˙ w = rw − α
 
re
x0+nt + r + (n − 1)
 
.
It remains to determine the initial value of w, or equivalently, the time at which all eﬀort stops.
Once this time T is set, we know that the wage must satisfy the terminal condition wT = α/pT.
Therefore, the planner’s problem reduces to ﬁnding the positive root T of the “budget” function
  T
0 n(v − nwt)e−xe−rtdt, where wt is given by the previous ODE. This gives, upon simpliﬁcation,







(n+r)T − 1) − (n − 1)e
nT(e







Setting δ := enT, the left-hand side admits a single positive critical point, which gives precisely
the solution to the monopolist’s problem (to be described below). This means that either the
left-hand side is positive when T → ∞, in which case it admits no strictly positive root, or it
is strictly negative, in which it admits exactly one root, and that root exceeds the optimal T
for the monopolist. Clearly, if n > r, the left-hand side is negative for large enough r, and we
assume so thereafter. To compare the belief at the time of stopping with the asymptotic belief in
the baseline model, αn/v (the solution to pv/n = α), we plug in the value of v/α corresponding
to this asymptotic threshold (i.e., v/α = nex0+nT), and argue that the left-hand side is negative
for r small enough (recall that the result was only claimed for r low enough). Indeed, deﬁne




1 + (X − 1)e
X 
r + o(r),
which is always negative, since 1 + (X − 1)eX ≥ 0. Thus, the root is such that the belief has
not yet reached the asymptotic belief of the baseline model. In fact, the limit of the left-hand
side as r → 0 does not vanish for v/α = nex0+nT, implying that the diﬀerence in those beliefs is
strict, even in the limit.
Proof of Theorem 5 (Principal’s Optimal Wage): Let us now turn to the problem of








subject to ˙ x = nu and ˙ w = rw − α(rex + r + (n − 1)u) (u := ui). Integrating by parts and














−x (rv − nα(re
x + r + (n − 1)u))e
−rtdt.
(Observe that there is a term in the integrand that is independent of x,u,w and can be ignored.)
Associate the co-state µ to the constraint ˙ w = rw − α(rex + r + (n − 1)u), and γ to ˙ x = nu.




−x (rv − nα(r + (n − 1)u))e
−rt 
+ γnu + µ(rw − α(re
x + r + (n − 1)u)) + λ(1 − u),
with λ ≥ 0 and λ(1 − u) = 0. So µ = µ0e−rt, and
(nγ − λ)e




rt − ˙ λe
rt + r
 
(n − 1)αµ0 − n(n − 1)αe
−x 
= n




−x (rv − nα(r + (n − 1)u))e
−rt + µ0e
rtαre
x = ˙ γ,
which implies that
ne






Observe that, if ˙ λ = 0 over some interval, then
µ0e





79from which it follows that x is constant over that interval, a contradiction. So λ is not constant,
and therefore, u = 1. Hence, x = x0 +nt (or more precisely, on any subinterval on which u = 1),
which gives
ne
−(x0+nt) (α − v) + αµ0
 







which can be integrated for λ and γ then follows. It remains to determine the initial value of w,
or equivalently, the time at which all eﬀort stops. Integrating the diﬀerential equation






nt + r + n − 1
 
gives wt, as a function of the as yet undetermined initial value w(δ), as given in Theorem 4. Let
T denote the time at which all eﬀort stops. Given that pTwT = α, and since pT =
p
p+(1−p)enT we
can solve for w0 = w(δ) as a function of δ = enT. We may now explicitly solve for the principal’s
payoﬀ, as a function of δ, and directly verify that it is concave in δ, with a maximum achieved
at the value of δ given in Section 4.2. The details are omitted.
To show that the proﬁt-maximizing time horizon T ∗ is shorter than the welfare-maximizing






















2nT ∝ −(n − ¯ p)
−2 ¯ p
−1α
−2 (¯ p − α)(1 − ¯ p)n
2 < 0,
since α < ¯ p. ￿
80C Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Theorem 6: We now consider the case with complementarities
˙ pt = −pt (1 − pt)f (u1,t,...,un,t).





(ptf (u1,t,...,un,t) − αui,t)e
−rt−
R t
0 psf(u1,s,...,un,s)dsdt = r


















−rtdt such that ˙ xt = f (u1,t,...,un,t).






−rt + λfi (u1,...,un) = 0, and ˙ λ = (r + αui)e
−x−rt,
where fi is the derivative of f with respect to ui. Assuming a symmetric solution (u1,t,...,un,t) =






−rt = −λfi(u), ˙ λ = −(r + αu)e
−x−rt, ˙ x = f(u).





































Again, it is simple to verify that, if α−1 ≥ kn/p, agents do not exert eﬀort at a maximal rate on
any interval of time in equilibrium. Suﬃciency follows as in the baseline model. While it is not
possible to solve for the function pt, its inverse t(p) can be computed, and it can be veriﬁed that
limp→αkn t(p) = ∞, while t(p) < ∞ for p > αkn. ￿
Proof of Theorem 7:








































) − r(1 + σ
ρ
i)). (13)
By adding equations (13) for each player, we obtain the relationship that needs to hold between



















Similarly, subtract equations (13), substitute the expression for u2 in (14), and use u1 =

























where σ1 (p) := u1,0/u2,0. Notice that σ1 will not be a function of r (hence patience will only
82inﬂuence levels of eﬀort, not the allocation).
(σ bounded.) We now drop the subscript 1 and refer to σ1 as σ. We ﬁrst show that σ stays
bounded for all p. Notice that when u2 = 0, that is when α/p = (σ2ρ−1 + 1)
 
(σρ + 1)2−1/ρ, σ′





σ2ρ−1 + 1 − α
p(σρ + 1)2−1/ρ.
To see this, consider the function x  → σρ(σ2ρ−1+1−x(σρ+1)2−1/ρ)−σρ(1−σρ−1)(1−x)ρ, which
has a minimum on [0,1] that is positive whenever ρ ≥ 1/2. Given this, and since the right-hand
side of (6) is bounded by −2/((1 − p)(1 − α/p)
ρ), the solution to (6) must lie below the solution









with the same initial condition at p. This diﬀerential equation is easy to integrate, and since
ρ < 1, its solution is ﬁnite at p = α. Furthermore, either σ is ﬁnite, or if it diverges, then α/p = 1
when σ → ∞, but then the previous argument applies. Note however that α/p → 1 requires
σ2ρ−1 + 1
(σρ + 1)2−1/ρ → 1
and so ρ > 1/2.
(Experimentation in inﬁnite time.) We know that σ′ → ∞ as u2 → 0. Now diﬀerentiate the
identity p(t(p)) = p, and obtain the following ODE for the function t(p):
t





Then compare t(q) with −ln(p − ¯ p). For p close to ¯ p := α(σρ + 1)2−1/ρ /(σ2ρ−1 + 1), we would





1/ρ < (p − ¯ p).




1/ρ − (p − ¯ p)


















































The case ρ = 1/2: Consider equation (6) again: let y := σ1−ρ, so that, when ρ = 1/2, we have:
(1 − y)α




















(Equilibrium.) The exact solution is then given by




⇒ σ (p) =
 
1 + g (p) +
 
g(p)
2 + 2g (p)
 2
,
and hence g (p) → ∞ and σ → ∞ as p → α. We can derive the equilibrium levels of eﬀort from
equation (14), and obtain that:





(g (p) + 2).









, we can show that
the solution to p′ = −p(1 − p)f (u1 (p),u2(p)) lies below the solution to
p














which converges to α/2 in ﬁnite time. So experimentation stops in ﬁnite time when ρ = 1/2.

















which is equivalent to, considering the inverse function p(σ),
p
′(σ) =






α(1 + σρ)1/ρ(σ2ρ−1 + 1) − (σ2ρ − 1)
 
.
It is immediate to verify that p′(σ)|p/α=g(σ) = 0, while g′(σ) < 0 for ρ < 1/2. This implies that
σ(p) cannot converge to a ﬁnite value, but that it must diverge to inﬁnity. Also, the second term





= 0, and lim
σ→∞
(1 + σρ)1/ρ(σ2ρ−1 + 1)
σ2ρ − 1
= +∞.
So if p does not converge to 0, p′(σ) is eventually positive, which is impossible. So p must
converge to zero. But exerting eﬀort for beliefs arbitrarily close to zero yields strictly negative
proﬁts, as even the team would not exert eﬀort for suﬃciently low beliefs. So such an equilibrium
cannot exist. ￿
Remarks on the case α1 = α2: Back to the case, ρ > 1/2, we know analyze the equilibria














































It is easy to show that when u2 > 0 and σ1 = 1, then σ′
1 (p) and (α2 − α1) have the same sign.
Let α2 > α1 so player 1 is the more eﬃcient agent. Since ˙ pt < 0, the equilibrium can never move
from a scenario with σ1 < 1 to one with σ1 > 1. Therefore, if agents take turns, the more eﬃcient
agent must exert higher eﬀort ﬁrst (and for σ0 close enough to one, this happens indeed). Both












This expression is minimized at σ∗ = (α2/α1)
1
1−ρ > 1, so the equilibrium with the highest









This threshold will be reached in inﬁnite time, since the corresponding terminal value for σ1 is
ﬁnite (see the proof of Theorem 6). Finally, notice that the value of p∗ is increasing in α2 and
equal to α2
1− 1
ρ if α1 = α2 = α.
Proof of Theorem 8: Applying integration by parts and ignoring constant terms, the payoﬀ

















juj − uk, k = 0,...,3.
Deﬁning xi such that pi = p3e−xi, for i = 1,2, note that ˙ xi = ui. Deﬁning also q := p
−1
3 , the





−rtdt such that ˙ q = (1 − q)(u1 + u2) + u1e
−x2 + u2e
−x1, ˙ xi = ui, i = 1,2.




1 − q + e
−xj 
+ µi, ˙ γ = (r + αui)e
−rt + γ (u1 + u2), ˙ µi = γuje
−xi,




1 − q + e
−xj 
+ µi, ˙ σ = (r + αui)e
−rt−x1−x2, ˙ µi = σuje
xj.




1 − q + e
−x 
+ µ, ˙ σ = (r + αu)e
−rt−2x, ˙ µ = σue
x, ˙ q = 2u
 
1 − q + e
−x 
, ˙ x = u.
Diﬀerentiate αqe−rt = σe2x (1 − q + e−x) + µ and substitute for ˙ σ and ˙ µ to get
α(˙ q − rq)e
−rt − (r + αu)e
−rt  




















So we are left with the system
q =
αu − r




, ˙ q = 2u
 
1 − q + e
−x 
, ˙ x = u.
We make the following change of variable. Let v(q) = x(t), so v′ (q) ˙ q = ˙ x, or 2v′ (q)
 
1 − q + e−v(q) 
=


























and, since t′(q) = v′(q)/u, we also get that t(q), the time at which the (inverse) belief is q, is







ln(C(1 − q(1 − α)) − 1 +
 














Observe that, as q → ∞, u = r(1 − α)/α > 0, while it is clearly negative for q ↓ 1. So
experimentation stops at some belief, although we may only reach this belief asymptotically. Let
s :=
 




1 − 2C − 2α(1 − C) +
 
1 − 4α(1 − α)(1 − C)
,
and ˜ p3, as deﬁned in the text, is the reciprocal of q∗. It follows from the explicit solution for F
that limq→q∗ t(q) = ∞, i.e. experimentation never stops. This characterizes the unique candidate
for an interior, symmetric solution, and it is easy to verify that, for low enough discounting (more
precisely, whenever u(q0), as given above, is less than 1), agents cannot exert eﬀort at a maximal
rate over some interval of time in equilibrium. Suﬃciency follows from the linearity and concavity
properties of the objective, as in the baseline model. ￿
The case in which p1  = p2: (Equilibrium with asymmetric players.) Suppose that ¯ p1 > ¯ p2.
88This means x1 (0) < x2 (0). In the unique equilibrium, player 1 exerts eﬀort at the maximal rate
until x1 (t) = x2 (t). From that point on, both agents work symmetrically. Clearly, the second
phase does not take place if p3 reaches ˜ p3 before x1 = x2. It is immediate to see that this is
an equilibrium. While player 1 works, player 2 prefers to wait. When exerting eﬀort at a level
that is interior, the two players play the mixed strategy equilibrium described in Theorem 5.
Finally, player 1 has incentives to work alone until the time at which x1 = x2, since player 2 is
not exerting eﬀort, and player 1 expects to work even after that time.
(Uniqueness.) For the uniqueness part, we repeatedly use the following claim: there cannot be a
last person working alone. While a detailed analysis is omitted, this result is intuitive: if there
exists a last agent i working alone, then in the last instants t in which player j is required to
work, he has an incentive to deviate and shirk. Since player i will start working at t+dt anyway,
the gains in saved eﬀort exceed the (vanishing) loss due to delayed arrival of a success. This
result rules out cases in which players work sequentially. Suppose that player 1 worked until his
individual threshold p∗
1. If the asymmetry in ¯ pi is suﬃciently small, player 2 would then start
working from there, because we would have p2 > p∗
1. But then, anticipating that player 2 will
start working at the maximal rate, player 1 wants to deviate and shirk in the last instants before
his beliefs reach the threshold. A qualitatively identical scenario arises if player 2 works alone
until the individual threshold p∗
2. We now analyze the candidate interior equilibrium, and rule it




1 − q + e
−xj 
+ µi, ˙ σ = (r + αui)e
−rt−x1−x2, ˙ µi = σuje
xj,
˙ q = (1 − q)(u1 + u2) + u1e
−x2 + u2e
−x1, ˙ xi = ui.
As before, diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst equation, and plug in the formulas for ˙ σ, ˙ µi, ˙ q. Upon simpliﬁca-




1 − q + e−xi + αq
1 − q + e−xj . (15)
89Given that ˙ xi = ui, we can also solve the equation
˙ q = (1 − q)(u1 + u2) + u1e
−x2 + u2e
−x1, (16)
and obtain as a general solution




for some constant k. As before, we deﬁne vi (q) := xi (t), so that
v
′
i (q) ˙ q = ˙ xi = ui.
Substituting (15) in (16), we obtain the following ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation, separately for
each agent’s eﬀort:
 







1 − q + e−vi + αq
1 − q + e−vj .
Finally, using (17), we obtain
 
1 − q + e
−vi + e











which is the desired ODE characterizing vi(q). Observe that the ODEs for v1 (q) and v2 (q)
diﬀer only because of the initial condition. In particular, vi (q (0)) = xi (0), implying that
v1 (q (0)) < v2 (q(0)). Since the paths of the solutions to the two ODEs cannot cross, v1 (q) will
reach zero for a level ˜ q for which v2 (˜ q) > 0. The fact that the weaker player works harder is
clearly necessary in order to have an interior (i.e. mixed strategy) equilibrium. When player
1 stops working, however, player 2 should continue exerting eﬀort at the maximal rate, and he
will be the last player working, which we ruled out. This rules out all but the equilibrium we
90described earlier.
Interpretation of ˜ p3 in terms of the team problem: We prove here that the threshold ˜ p3
is also the threshold at which the team would stop, if the value was 1/2 per agent. In the team
problem, agents would choose to allocate eﬀorts equally (if p1 = p2), and they would exert eﬀort















The optimal time then satisﬁes (taking ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to T)
−(r + 2α)qTe
−rT + rqTe
−rT − ˙ qTe












The solution to ˙ q = 2
 




is 1 − qt = ke−2t − 2
p1
p3e−t, with k := −
p0
p3. This gives
−α + (1 − α)
p0p3
(p1)2z
2 + (1 − 2α)z = 0,
for z :=
p1












1 − 2C − 2α(1 − C) +
 
1 − 4α(1 − α)(1 − C)
= 1/˜ p
3.
Therefore, eﬀort stops when the belief reaches the same threshold in both problems. ￿
91D Additional Proofs
D.1 Observable Eﬀorts with Deadlines
We identify an equilibrium in three phases. For a given prior belief ¯ p, agents initially exert
interior eﬀort levels (phase 1); they then stop working for an interval of time (phase 2); and
ﬁnally, they exert maximal eﬀort until the deadline (phase 3). Either phase 1 or both phases 1
and 2 could be empty. We solve for the optimal strategies proceeding backwards in time, and so
we start from the deadline T.
(Phase 3.) Suppose the posterior belief pt and the remaining time T −t are such that all agents
are exerting maximal eﬀort ui = 1. Under the Markov assumption, all agents will continue
choosing ui = 1 even after a deviation. Therefore, the individual incentives to deviate from
maximal eﬀort are unchanged from the unobservable case, and the proof of Lemma 2 extends
to the observable case. In particular, we obtain a critical time ˜ t after which agents can sustain
maximal eﬀort until the end of the game, given the deadline T and the current posterior p. This
time is analogous to ˜ T in equation (9), and it is given by





α(n − p) − r(p − α)
.








{(ui + u−i)p − uiα − (r + (ui + u−i)p)V − (ui + u−i)p(1 − p)Vp + Vt}, (18)
and let W (p,t) indicate the continuation value, given by the returns to n players exerting eﬀort
ui,t = 1 from time t until the deadline T.


























Substitute W (p,t) into the optimality equation (18), and consider the incentives to exert eﬀort:
∂W
∂ui
= p − α − pW − p(1 − p)Wp. (19)
It is immediate to verify that the right-hand side of (19) is equal to zero when t = ˜ t(p). Therefore,












= pexp(−(T − t)(n + r))(n − α) > 0,
so agents have strict incentives to work throughout the third phase.
(Phase 2.) If the deadline is long enough, so that ˜ t(¯ p) > 0, there exists a phase in which players







We now use Ω(p,t) to construct the frontier ˆ t(p) that separates the region in the (p,t) space
with interior eﬀort from the shirking region. If eﬀort is interior, by the optimality equation, the
value function must satisfy the ordinary diﬀerential equation
pα − V (p,t) − p(1 − p)Vp (p,t) = 0, (20)
93which is obtained by setting by the right-hand side of (19) equal to zero. The general solution
of equation (20) is given by
V (p,t) = 1 − α +
 




(1 − p). (21)


















We can then solve for the second switching frontier ˆ t(p), and obtain












α2 (1 − p)(n − 1)
(α(n + r) − p(α + r))(p − α)
 






α2 (1 − p)(n − 1)
(α(n + r) − p(α + r))(p − α)
 
,
where the log term is always positive. We also obtain the equilibrium value of the constant of
integration k (t) in equation (21):
k(t) =
Ω(ˆ p(t),t) − (1 − α)
1 − ˆ p(t)
+ αln
ˆ p(t)
1 − ˆ p(t)
,
where ˆ p(t) is the inverse function of ˆ t(p). Finally, we verify the optimality of zero eﬀort in this





. Now ﬁx a p and evaluate how the expression is changing with t. We have
d[LHS(20)]
dt
= −r (p − α) < 0,
so agents have no incentives to exert eﬀort at any time past the frontier ˆ t(p).
94(Phase 1.) In the ﬁrst phase, interior eﬀort implies u(p,t) must satisfy the optimality equation
V (p,t) = 1 − α + (1 − p)
 
Ω(ˆ p(t),t) − (1 − α)
1 − ˆ p(t)
+ αln
ˆ p(t)





so it must be that
u(p,t) =
rV (p,t) − Vt (p,t)
α(n − 1)
.
Optimality of interior eﬀort then follows by construction. Furthermore, the equilibrium evolution
of beliefs is given by the solution to
˙ p = −p(1 − p)nu(p,t).
The next ﬁgure illustrates the evolution of beliefs and the loci (p,t) separating the three phases.
D.2 Learning-by-Doing
Following Doraszelski (2003), we model the accumulated knowledge of player i as
˙ zi = ui − δzi,
with z0 = 0 (though this boundary condition is not necessary, as we will see). The arrival rate
of a breakthrough, or human capital, for player i is given by
hi = λui + ρz
φ
i .
It follows that beliefs evolve according to




































Figure 13: The three phases of the equilibrium


























by the usual integration by parts. Deﬁning, as usual x = ln((1 − p)/p), so that ˙ x =
 
i hi,t, and





−x − (1 + e
−x)αui)e
−rtdt.
Again, we integrate the ﬁrst term by parts, and ignore the values at the endpoint (ﬁxed, or zero),







































subject to ˙ xt =
 
j hj,t, and ˙ zi = ui−δzi. When ρ = 0 and λ = 1 we recover the expression from

















































+ µ(ui − δzi).
97We now assume λ = 1 and we seek an interior solution. We then must have
γ + µ = 0. (22)
The co-state variables obey


































We let g := γert and m := µert, and then obtain
˙ g = rg + 1 + e











φ−1 + (δ + r)m.
By diﬀerentiating condition (22), we can write
rg + 1 + e










φ−1 + (δ + r)m = 0, (23)

















By diﬀerentiating condition (23), we obtain
r˙ g − ˙ xe
−x(n − 1)u + nρzφ
r
+ e













φ−1 − gρφ(φ − 1)z
φ−2 ˙ z − (r + δ) ˙ g = 0.
98We can then solve for ˙ u, and write
˙ u(n − 1) = −˙ x
 
βr − (n − 1)u − nρz
φ + ρφz
φ−1 















where g is given by (24). We now have three autonomous ordinary diﬀerential equations, for
u(t), x(t) and z (t). We therefore deﬁne
ζ (x) = z (t)
υ(x) = u(t),
so that ζ












˙ x = n(λυ + ρζ
φ).
In order to determine the terminal conditions, we construct a frontier (p,z) with the property
that u(p,z (p)) = 0 represents a stopping point (remember that p = (1 + ex)
−1).
We can write the agents’ equilibrium value as












i + (n − 1)z
φ
 










i (ui − δzi).
It follows that the optimality condition for eﬀort provision is given by
0 = p − α − pV + Vhφρz
φ−1
i − p(1 − p)Vp.
The continuation payoﬀ, given beliefs p and total accumulated knowledge z, can be written as






































Therefore, the stopping frontier (p,z) must solve






and we can therefore express the stopping frontier as the function z∗ (p) solving






















Finally, a straightforward argument implies that u = 0 at the stopping point. This means we
100can solve (26) and (27) for x ∈ [x0, ¯ x], with terminal conditions







With this procedure we can obtain the pre-images of points along the stopping frontier z∗ (p),
and trace the paths back to an initial point (p,z) = (p0,0).
We now provide illustrations of how parameters aﬀect the frontier, and a generic path in
(x,z) path. We start with the impact of the decay rate, δ (Figure 10).






































Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.75, α=0.25, ρ=1, φ=1

































Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.01, α=0.25, ρ=1, φ=1
Figure 14: Public belief and accumulated knowledge, as a function of δ
Finally, we consider the impact of the relative importance of accumulated knowledge in the
arrival rate of success, ρ (Figure 11).



































Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.1, α=0.25, ρ=10, φ=1































Parameters: r=0.2, n=2, δ=0.1, α=0.25, ρ=0.1, φ=1
Figure 15: Public belief and accumulated knowledge, as a function of ρ
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